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1  
CLEAR  DEPICTIONS  PROMOTE  CLEAR  DECISIONS:  
DRAFTING  ABORTION  SPEECH-­‐‑AND-­‐‑DISPLAY  
STATUTES  THAT  PASS  FIRST  AND  FOURTEENTH  
AMENDMENT  MUSTER  
Ryan  J.F.  Pulkrabek*  
INTRODUCTION  
Pro-­‐‑life   and   pro-­‐‑choice   camps   continue   to   fight   an   abortion  
rights  battle  in  the  legal  arena—with  both  sides  determined  not  
to  give  any  ground.     This   tug-­‐‑of-­‐‑war  over   the  broader  abortion  
debate  can  make  it  difficult  to  examine  narrower  legal  questions  
that   implicate   abortion   on   their   own  merits   as   a  matter   of   law  
and  public  policy.    The  abortion  struggle  generates  heat  but  little  
light.      Consider   the   issue   of   “speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display”   statutes,  
which  can  promote  informed  consent  by  requiring  physicians  to  
take,  display,  and  describe  an  ultrasound  to  patients  seeking  an  
abortion  before   conducting   an   abortion  procedure.      The  drama  
of   the   broader   abortion   debate   has   distracted   from   the   central  
law   and   public   policy   issues   surrounding   these   statutes.    
Ultimately,  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statutes,   if  drafted  properly,  are  
constitutional  under  the  First  and  Fourteenth  Amendments  and  
can  be  used   to  promote  women’s  health;  a   sound  public  policy  
everyone  should  be  able  to  agree  upon.  
Speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statutes   raise   two  constitutional   issues:  
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(1)   whether   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes   violate   a   woman’s  
personal   autonomy   by   creating   an   undue   burden   on   abortion  
and  (2)  whether  requiring  a  physician  to  describe  an  ultrasound  
to   a   patient   seeking   an   abortion   violates   a   physician’s   First  
Amendment  right  by  compelling  speech.    Only  two  circuits  have  
grappled  with   these   issues  and  both  have   ruled   in   favor  of   the  
statutes;  however,  the  Middle  District  of  North  Carolina  and  the  
Oklahoma   Supreme   Court   have   struck   down   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑
display   statutes,   which   showcases   the   burgeoning   divide   over  
the  issue.  
While  these  constitutional  concerns  are  real,  states  can  draft  
speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes   in   a   manner   that   does   not   violate  
patients’   or   physicians’   constitutional   rights   and   also  minimize  
the  risks   that  courts  will  erroneously   invalidate   the  statutes.     A  
model  statute  should  require  a  physician  to  take  a  non-­‐‑invasive,  
abdominal   ultrasound   and   require   a   physician   to   speak   and  
display   information   that   is   objective,   truthful,   and   medically  
relevant  to  a  patient’s  abortion  decision.    This  Article’s  principal  
purpose  is  to  guide  legislatures  in  passing  constitutional  speech-­‐‑
and-­‐‑display  statutes.     To  that  end,   the  Article  outlines  the  basic  
elements   of   a   model   statute,   explains   why   the   statute   is  
constitutional,  and  provides  the  full  text  of  a  model  statute  in  the  
Appendix.  
The   most   detrimental   component   to   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  
statutes   is   the   way   they   are   framed   by   politicians.      Pro-­‐‑life  
politics   arguably   promote   these   statutes   as   a   means   of  
discouraging  abortions.    Whatever  one  thinks  of  that  goal,  it  has  
a  polarizing  and  unnecessary  effect  on  public  debate  and  on  the  
drafting   of   the   statutes.      The   principal   goal   of   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑
display   statutes   should   be   to   empower   women   by   providing  
them  with  the  necessary  and  pertinent  information  to  truly  make  
an   autonomous   decision   regarding   their   reproductive   health.    
While  many  participants  in  the  abortion  debate  have  a  capacious  
understanding  of  the  abortion  procedure,  a  layperson  cannot  be  
expected  to  share  that  knowledge,  and  a  state  owes  an  obligation  
to   its   citizens   to   protect   them   by   empowering   them   with   this  
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knowledge.  
Part   One   of   this   Article   surveys   the   legal   landscape   of  
abortion   and   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   law.      Part   Two   highlights  
components  of  a  model  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statute  that  will  pass  
First   and   Fourteenth   Amendment   muster   and   promote   good  
public  policy.    (The  full  text  of  the  model  statute  is  placed  in  the  
Appendix   and  a   summary   is  provided   in   the   text.)      Part  Three  
explains  why  a  properly  drafted  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statute  does  
not  create  an  undue  burden  on  a  patient  seeking  an  abortion:  the  
model   statute   does   not   have   the   purpose   or   effect   of   placing   a  
substantial  obstacle   in  the  path  of  a  patient  seeking  an  abortion  
but   instead  promotes   a  woman’s  mental  health   and   respect   for  
the  life  of  the  unborn.    This  part  further  shows  that  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑
display   statutes   provide   only   information   that   is   medically  
necessary  to  support  informed  consent.     Part  Four  shows  that  a  
properly  drafted  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statute  does  not  violate  the  
First   Amendment   because   it   merely   compels   physicians   to  
convey   information   that   is   non-­‐‑ideological,   truthful,   and  
medically   relevant.      Part   Four   also   explains   why   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑
display  statutes  need   to  pass  only  rational  basis   review.      In   the  
alternative,   Part   Four   also   advances   an   argument   for   an  
intermediate   level   of   scrutiny   for   compelled   disclosures   of  
medically   relevant   information,   which   the   author   calls  
“deferential  balancing,”  and  explains  why  the  model  statute  can  
pass  that  standard  of  review.    Lastly,  Part  Four  makes  a  case  that  
speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes   may   even   pass   a   strict   level   of  
scrutiny,  if  that  test  were  thought  to  apply.  
BACKGROUND    
ABORTION-­‐‑RELATED  PRECEDENTS    
Roe  v.  Wade    
In  Roe,  the  Court  held  that  state  criminal  abortion  laws  that  
do   not   regard   the   stage   of   the   pregnancy   and   only   create   an  
exception   for   life-­‐‑saving   medical   procedures   violate   the  
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Fourteenth   Amendment   Due   Process   Clause   right   to   privacy.1    
In   addition,   the   Court   held   that   a   woman   has   the   right   to  
terminate   her   pregnancy   before   viability.2      Throughout   the  
opinion,  the  Court  referred  to  the  fetus  as  a  “potential  life.”3    The  
personal  privacy  right  to  an  abortion  decision  is  not  unqualified,  
though,  as  a  “[s]tate  may  properly  assert   important   interests   in  
safeguarding   health,   in  maintaining  medical   standards,   and   in  
protecting  potential  life.”4  
Planned  Parenthood  of  Southeastern  Pennsylvania  v.  Casey    
In   Casey,   the   first   key   issue   was   whether   requiring   a  
physician   to   inform   a   patient   seeking   an   abortion   of   specific  
health   risks   constituted   compelled   speech   in   violation   of   the  
First   Amendment.5      The   Pennsylvania   statute   required   that   a  
physician  inform  a  pregnant  patient  of  the  “probable  gestational  
age  of  the  unborn  child”  at  least  24  hours  prior  to  performing  the  
abortion.6      The   Supreme   Court   held   that   it   is   not  
unconstitutional   to   require   a   physician   to   inform   a   patient  
seeking   an   abortion   of   the   “nature   of   the   procedure,   the  
attendant  health  risks  and  those  of  childbirth,  and  the  ‘probable  
gestational   age’   of   the   fetus,”   as   long   as   the   information   a  
physician   is   required   to   provide   is   “truthful”   and   “non[-­‐‑
]misleading.”7      The   Court   included   the   age   of   the   fetus   as  
truthful   and   non-­‐‑misleading   information   that   the   State   could  
require   a   physician   to   provide   because   the   information   is  
important   to   a  patient’s   abortion  decision   and  may  attribute   to  
her  overall  mental  health.8  
 
   1.     Roe  v.  Wade,  410  U.S.  113,  164  (1973).      
   2.     Id.  at  163-­‐‑64.  
   3.     See  generally  id.  
   4.     Id.  at  154.  
   5.     Planned  Parenthood  of  Se.  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U.S.  833,  885  (1992).  
   6.     Id.  at  881  (requiring  also  that  a  physician  inform  a  patient  at  least  24  hours  
prior   to  performing  the  abortion  of   the  “nature  of   the  procedure”  and  “the  health  
risks  of  the  abortion  and  of  childbirth.”).  
   7.     Id.  at  882.    
   8.     Id.  (reasoning  that  if  a  patient  is  not  fully  informed  of  the  procedure  and  its  
ramifications,  she  may  later  discover  information  that  would  have  played  a  role  in  
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Another   key   issue   in   Casey   was   whether   broadening   the  
informed   consent   requirement   of   a   physician   to   a   patient   is  
constitutional  even  if   the   information  a  physician  is  required  to  
supply   has   “no   direct   relation   to   [the   patient’s]   health.”9      The  
Pennsylvania  statute  required   that  a  physician   inform  a  patient  
about   the   availability   of   printed   information   published   by   the  
State   pertaining   to   fetal   development,   child   support,   and  
alternatives  to  an  abortion.    It  also  required  a  patient  seeking  an  
abortion  to  certify  “in  writing  that  she  has  been  informed  of  the  
availability   of   these   printed   materials   and   has   been   provided  
them  if  she  chooses  to  view  them.”10  
The  Court  held   that   this   is   constitutional,   as   the  State  may  
“further  its  legitimate  goal  of  protecting  the  life  of  the  unborn  by  
enacting  legislation  aimed  at  ensuring  a  decision  that   is  mature  
and   informed,   even   when   in   so   doing   the   State   expresses   a  
preference   for   childbirth   over   abortion.”11      The  Court   reasoned  
that  requiring  a  physician  to  inform  a  patient  of  the  information  
published  by  the  State  not  only  did  not  violate  the  Constitution  
because   protecting   the   life   of   the   unborn   is   a   legitimate   state  
interest,   but   it   also   does   not   place   an   undue   burden   on   the  
patient  seeking  an  abortion.12  
The  Court  in  Lakey  reaffirmed  the  Court  in  Casey  by  holding  
that   requiring   a   physician   to   provide   informed   consent   which  
includes   truthful,   non-­‐‑misleading   information   is   “part   of   the  
state’s   reasonable   regulation  of  medical  practice  and   [does]  not  
fall   under   the   rubric   of   compelling   ‘ideological’   speech   that  
triggers  First  Amendment  strict  scrutiny.”13    Because  this  type  of  
 
her   decision   as   to   whether   to   receive   the   abortion   and   that   information   may   be  
detrimental  to  her  mental  health).    
   9.     Id.   at   882-­‐‑83   (specifically   referring   to   information   that   only   pertains   to   a  
fetus   rather   than   a   woman   seeking   an   abortion,   as   informed   consent   typically  
protects  a  patient  only).  
   10.     Id.  at  881.  
   11.     Id.  at  883.  
   12.     Id.  
   13.     Tex.  Med.  Providers  Performing  Abortion  Servs.  v.  Lakey,  667  F.3d  570,  576  
(5th  Cir.  2012);  The  United  States  Supreme  Court,  in  Gonzales  v.  Carhart,  deemed  the  
State’s   role   in   the   regulating   the   medical   profession   “significant.”      Id.   (citing  
Gonzales  v.  Carhart,  550  U.S.  124,  127  (2007)).  
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speech  does  not  trigger  strict  scrutiny,  it  receives  a  lower  level  of  
scrutiny   and   is   upheld   because   it   furthers   the   legitimate   state  
interest  of  protecting  fetal  life.14  
Lastly,  Casey   affirmed   the  principle  holding   in  Roe  v.  Wade  
that  a  woman  has   the  “right   to   terminate  her  pregnancy  before  
viability,”   but   it   replaced   the   trimester   framework   with   an  
undue   burden   standard.15      An   undue   burden   is   “a   state  
regulation   [that]   has   the   purpose   or   effect   of   placing   a  
substantial  obstacle  in  the  path  of  a  woman  seeking  an  abortion  
of  a  nonviable   fetus.”16     The  Court   furthered  the  undue  burden  
standard  by  stating:  
A   statute   with   this   purpose   is   invalid   because   the  
means   chosen   by   the   State   to   further   the   interest   in  
potential  life  must  be  calculated  to  inform  the  woman’s  
free   choice,   not   hinder   it.     And   a   statute  which,  while  
furthering   the   interest   in   potential   life   or   some   other  
valid   state   interest,   has   the   effect   of   placing   a  
substantial   obstacle   in   the   path   of   a   woman’s   choice  
cannot  be  considered  a  permissible  means  of  serving  its  
legitimate  ends.17  
COMPELLED  SPEECH  PRECEDENTS  
Wooley  v.  Maynard  
The  First  Amendment   right  not   to   speak  was   examined   in  
Wooley   v.   Maynard,   when   the   Court   addressed   whether   it   was  
constitutional   to   require   the   citizens   of   New   Hampshire   to  
display   compelled   speech18   on   the   license   plates   of   all   non-­‐‑
 
   14.     Tex.  Med.  Providers  Performing  Abortion  Servs.,  667  F.3d  570;  The  Casey  
decision  was  reaffirmed  in  Gonzales  v.  Carhart,  in  which  the  United  States  Supreme  
Court  upheld  the  Partial-­‐‑Birth  Abortion  Ban  Act  of  2003  because  “[t]he  government  
may  use  its  voice  and  regulatory  authority  to  show  its  profound  respect  for  the  life  
within  the  woman.”    Id.  (citing  Gonzales,  550  U.S.  at  128,  157).  
   15.     Planned  Parenthood  of  Se.  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U.S.  833,  876-­‐‑77,  879  (1992).  
   16.     Id.  at  877.  
   17.     Id.    
   18.     The  compelled  speech  was  the  state  motto,  “Live  Free  or  Die,”  and  it  was  
offensive   to   certain   followers   of   the   Jehovah’s   Witnesses   church.      Wooley   v.  
Maynard,  430  U.S.  705,  707  (1977).    
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commercial  vehicles  even  though  it  was  offensive  to  their  moral  
convictions.19      Police   arrested   George   Maynard   for   violating   a  
New  Hampshire  misdemeanor   statute  because  he  obscured   the  
state  motto  on  his  license  plate.20    The  Court  held  that  requiring  
citizens  to  display  a  state  motto  consisting  of  ideological  speech  
was  unconstitutional.21  
In  reaching   its  holding,   the  Court  stated  that  an   individual  
has   the   right   to   not   speak   at   all.22      Maynard’s   interest   in   not  
displaying   speech   from   the  State  on  his   license  plate,  which  he  
finds   morally   objectionable,   triggered   his   First   Amendment  
protection   but   was   not   enough   to   deem   the   statute  
unconstitutional:   further   analysis   is   required.23      The  Court   also  
assessed  whether  the  statute  was  narrowly  tailored  and  whether  
it   served  a   compelling   state   interest.24     New  Hampshire   license  
plates   were   readily   distinguishable   from   other   state   license  
plates   without   the   state   motto;   thus,   the   statute   was   not  
narrowly   tailored,   as   New   Hampshire   could   clearly   meet   its  
need   to   distinguish   its   license   plates   from   other   states’   license  
plates   without   infringing   upon   personal   liberties.25      More  
importantly   for   this  Article,   though,   the  Court   reasoned   that   a  
state  could  not  communicate  its  ideological  message  in  a  manner  
that   outweighs   an   individual’s   First   Amendment   protection,  
even  if  it  is  narrowly  tailored  and  is  a  compelling  state  interest.26    
Ultimately,   for   compelled   speech   to  be  unconstitutional,   a  First  
Amendment   protection   must   be   triggered   and   the   protection  
 
   19.     Id.  at  706-­‐‑07.  
   20.     Maynard  had  covered  up  the  motto  on  his  license  plate  and  refused  to  pay  
the  fines  in  conjunction  with  his  citation  for  violating  the  statute.    He  was  fined  and  
sentenced  to  serve  fifteen  days  in  jail.    Id.  at  707-­‐‑8.  
   21.     Id.  at  713.  
   22.     The   Court   stated   that   “the   right   of   freedom   of   thought   protected   by   the  
First  Amendment  against  state  action  includes  both  the  right  to  speak  freely  and  the  
right  to  refrain  from  speaking  at  all.”    Id.  at  714.      
   23.     Id.  at  715.    
   24.     Id.  at  716.    
   25.     Id.    
   26.     The   Court   stated   that   a   state   cannot   convey   its   ideological  message   in   a  
manner   that   “outweigh[s]   an   individual’s   First   Amendment   right   to   avoid  
becoming  the  courier  for  such  message[,]"ʺ  no  matter  how  acceptable  that  message  is  
to  some  of  its  citizens.  Id.  at  717.      
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must  outweigh  the  narrowly  tailored,  compelling  state  interest.27  
Zauderer  v.  Office  of  Disciplinary  Counsel  of  Supreme  Court  of  
Ohio  
Although   Zauderer   pertains   to   compelled   speech   in   the  
commercial   context,   it   parallels   with   compelled   disclosures   in  
the   medical   profession.      The   appellant   in   Zauderer   was   an  
attorney   in   Ohio   who   was   subject   to   the   Ohio   Code   of  
Professional   Responsibility.28      He   violated   the   Code   when   he  
published   a   newspaper   advertisement   that   offered   a  
contingency-­‐‑fee  arrangement  to  clients  that  did  not  inform  them  
“they  would  be  liable  for  costs  (as  opposed  to  legal  fees)  even  if  
their   claims   were   unsuccessful  .  .  .  .”29      The   advertisement  
violated   an   Ohio   Disciplinary   Rule   because   it   may   deceive   a  
layperson  into  thinking  representation  by  the  attorney  is  a  win-­‐‑
win  situation  because  he  or  she  does  not  know  the  legal  nuances  
that  make  a  legal  fee  different  from  a  legal  cost.30    The  appellant  
challenged  the  constitutionality  of  the  Disciplinary  Rule  arguing  
that  it  violated  his  First  Amendment  right  not  to  speak.31  
The   Supreme   Court   distinguishes   between   “disclosure  
requirements  and  outright  prohibitions  on  speech,”32  stating  that  
“disclosure   requirements   trench   much   more   narrowly   on   an  
advertiser’s   interests   than   do   flat   prohibitions   on   speech.”33    
Because   of   this   difference,   the   Supreme   Court   held   that   an  
advertiser’s   First  Amendment   rights   are   “adequately   protected  
as  long  as  disclosure  requirements  are  reasonably  related  to  the  
 
   27.     Id.   at   716-­‐‑17;   In   addition   to   triggering   First   Amendment   protections,   a  
physician’s  First  Amendment   right  not   to   speak   is  viewed  within   the  “practice  of  
medicine,   subject   to   reasonable   licensing  and   regulation  by   the  State.”     Tex.  Med.  
Providers  Performing  Abortion  Servs.  v.  Lakey,  667  F.3d  570,  575  (5th  Cir.  2012).    
   28.     Zauderer  v.  Office  of  Disciplinary  Counsel  of  Sup.  Ct.  of  Ohio,  471  U.S.  626,  
629  (1985).    
   29.     Id.  at  633.    Specifically,  the  advertisement  violated  DR  2-­‐‑101(A)  and  DR  2-­‐‑
101(B)(15).    Id.  at  635.  
   30.     Id.  at  631-­‐‑33,  652.  
   31.     Id.  at  636,  650.  
   32.     Id.    
   33.     Id.  at  651.  
FINALCOPY.PULKRABEK.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   2/20/14    2:13  PM  
2013]   CLEAR  DEPICTIONS  PROMOTE  CLEAR  DECISIONS   9  
State’s  interest  in  preventing  deception  of  consumers.”34  
THE  SPEECH-­‐‑AND-­‐‑DISPLAY  LAWS  
The  Texas  Statute  
The  Texas  Health  and  Safety  Code  Section  171.012  lays  out  
the   parameters   of   obtaining   informed   consent   in   an   abortion  
procedure.35      In  pertinent  part,   it  requires  a  physician  who  is  to  
perform   an   abortion   to   inform   a   patient   of   the   “probable  
gestational   age   of   the   unborn   child.”36      It   further   requires   a  
physician,   “or   an   agent   of   [a]   physician   who   is   also   a  
sonographer   certified   by   a   national   registry   of   medical  
sonographers[,]”   to   take   and   display   a   sonogram   “in   a   quality  
consistent  with  current  medical  practice.”37  
A   physician   or   qualified   sonographer   must   also   describe  
certain  features  of  the  sonogram  “in  a  manner  understandable  to  
a   layperson,”   including:   a   “medical   description   of   the  
dimensions   of   the   embryo   or   fetus,   the   presence   of   cardiac  
activity,   and   the   presence   of   external   members   and   internal  
organs.”38    A  physician  or  sonographer  must  also  make  “audible  
the  heart  auscultation  for  [a]  pregnant  woman  to  hear,  if  present,  
in   a   quality   consistent   with   current   medical   practice”   and  
provide  a  verbal  explanation  of  the  heartbeat.39  
The  Texas  statute  requires  a  patient  to  sign  an  election  form,  
which   ensures   that   she   received   the   aforementioned  
information.40      The   election   form   also   provides   exceptions   for  
receiving   an   ultrasound   display   and   description   for   patients  
who  are  pregnant  “as  a  result  of  a  sexual  assault,  incest,  or  other  
violation  of  the  Texas  Penal  Code  that  has  been  reported  to  law  
 
   34.     Id.    
   35.     TEX.  HEALTH  &  SAFETY  CODE  ANN.  §  171.012  (West  2012  &  Supp.  2012).  
   36.     Id.  §171.012(1)(C).  
   37.     Id.  §  171.012(a)(4)(A)-­‐‑(B).  
   38.     Id.  §  171.012(a)(4)(C).  
   39.     Id.  §  171.012(a)(4)(D).  
   40.     Id.  §  171.012(a)(5)(1)-­‐‑(6).  
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enforcement  authorities  or   that  has  not  been   reported  because”  
of   fear   of   exposure   to   retaliation   “resulting   in   serious   bodily  
injury.”41      It   also  provides   an   exception   for  minors,   irreversible  
medical   conditions   or   abnormalities,   and   for   women   who   live  
100  miles  or  more  from  the  nearest  abortion  provider.42  
The  Oklahoma  Statute  
The  standard   for  obtaining   informed  consent   in  Oklahoma  
is   set   forth   in   Title   63   of   the   Oklahoma   Public   Health   Code  
Section  1-­‐‑738.2.43    The  statute  requires  an  ultrasound  provider  to  
inform   the   patient   of   the   availability   of   a   sonogram   and   heart  
monitoring   by   telephone   or   in   person.44      Not   only   does   the  
disclosure   in   Oklahoma   not   have   to   be   made   in   person,   but  
speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   of   a   sonogram   is  made   optional.45      It   need  
only   be   offered.      The   statute   uses   the   term   “unborn   child”   to  
describe  a  fetus.46  
The  North  Carolina  Statute  
The   North   Carolina   General   Statute   Section   90-­‐‑21.82  
requirement   for   obtaining   informed   consent   requires   that  
physicians   or   qualified   professionals   provide   oral   information  
 
   41.     Id.  §  171.012(a)(5)(6)(alteration  of  original).    
   42.     Id.  
   43.     This   statute   was   deemed   unconstitutional   and   void   under   the   single  
subject   rule   in  Nova  Health  Sys.  v.  Edmondson,   233  P.3d  380,  382   (Okla.  2010).     The  
court  did  not  need  to  consider   the  merits  of   the  statute  because   it  contained  more  
than  one  subject.    Id.    
   44.     OKLA.  STAT.  ANN.  tit.  63  §  1-­‐‑738.2(B)(1)-­‐‑(2)  (West  2004  &  Supp.  2012-­‐‑2013).    
The  statute  states   that  “[e]xcept   in   the  case  of  a  medical  emergency,  consent   to  an  
abortion   is   voluntary   and   informed   if   and   only   if”   the   patient   is   informed   “by  
telephone   or   in   person,   by   the  physician  who   is   to   perform   the   abortion,   or   by   a  
referring  physician,  or  by  an  agent  of  either  physician  .  .  .  that  ultrasound  imaging  
and   heart   tone  monitoring   that   enable   the   pregnant   woman   to   view   her   unborn  
child   or   listen   to   the   heartbeat   of   the   unborn   child   are   available   to   the   pregnant  
woman."ʺ      Id.   §   1-­‐‑738.2(B)(1)(a)(5).   “The   physician   or   agent   of   the   physician   shall  
inform   the   pregnant  woman   that   the  web   site   and   printed  material,   described   in  
Section  1-­‐‑738.3  of  this  title,  contain  phone  numbers  and  addresses  for  facilities  that  
offer  such  services  at  no  cost  .  .  .  ."ʺ    Id.  
   45.     See  generally  id.  §  1-­‐‑738.2.    
   46.     Id.  
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including,  the  “probable  gestational  age  of  the  unborn  child  at  the  
time  the  abortion  is  to  be  performed.”47    An  ultrasound  provider  
must   then   display   a   “real-­‐‑time   view   of   the   unborn   child   and  
heart   tone  monitoring  that  enable  the  pregnant  woman  to  view  
her   unborn   child   or   listen   to   the   heartbeat   of   the   unborn  
child  .  .  .  .”48      The   North   Carolina   statute   does   not   explicitly  
require  a  simultaneous  description  of  the  fetal  life.49    A  physician  
or   qualified   professional   is   merely   required   to   provide  
information   regarding   the   risk   of   carrying   the   pregnancy   to  
term,  the  risks  of  the  procedure,  the  name  of  the  physician  who  
is   to   perform   the   abortion,   and   other   information   that   is   not  
directly  related  to  the  ultrasound.50  
The  Louisiana  Statute  
Louisiana   has   passed   the   most   comprehensive   and   up-­‐‑to-­‐‑
date  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statute.    Louisiana  Session  Law  Service  
685,51   the   statute,   identifies   who   is   qualified   to   perform   an  
ultrasound,  which  includes  the  “physician  who  is  to  perform  the  
abortion   or   a   qualified   person  who   is   the   physician’s   agent.”52    
That   qualified   person  must   perform   an   obstetric   ultrasound   at  
least   twenty-­‐‑four   hours   prior   to   conducting   the   operation   and  
“simultaneously   display   the   screen   which   depicts   the   active  
ultrasound   images   so   that   the   pregnant   woman   may   view  
them.”53      A   physician   must   give   a   woman   the   opportunity   to  
hear   the   heartbeat   by   using   technology   that   is   “in   a   quality  
consistent   with   the   current   medical   practice.”54      The   statute  
merely  requires  a  physician  to  offer  to  display  the  sonogram  to  a  
patient  and  to  make  audible  the  heart  auscultations;   it  does  not  
 
   47.     N.C.  GEN.  STAT.  §  90-­‐‑21.82(1)(c)  (2011)  (emphasis  added).  
   48.     Id.  §  90-­‐‑21.82(1)(e)  (emphasis  added).  
   49.     See  id.  §  90-­‐‑21.82.  
   50.     Id.  §  90-­‐‑21.82(1)(a)-­‐‑(g).  
   51.     2012   LA.   ACTS   685   (S.B.   708)   (codified   at   LA.   REV.   STAT.   ANN.   §   40:1299  
(2013)).      
   52.     Id.  §  40:1299.35.2(D)(1).  
   53.     Id.  §  40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(a).  
   54.     Id.  
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require   physicians   to   actually   display   it,   nor   does   it   require  
patients  to  hear  the  heartbeat.55  
The   statute   also   requires   that   an   ultrasound   provider  
“provide   a   simultaneous   and   objectively   accurate   oral  
explanation   of   what   the   ultrasound   is   depicting,   in   a   manner  
understandable   to   a   layperson.”56      The   description   should  
include   “the   presence   and   location   of   the   unborn   child.  .  .the  
number   of   unborn   children   depicted,   the   dimensions   of   the  
unborn  child,  and  the  presence  of  cardiac  activity  if  present  and  
viewable,  along  with  the  opportunity  for  the  pregnant  woman  to  
ask   questions.”57      Again,   a   physician   need   only   offer   the  
explanation,  but  he  or   she   is  not   required   to  give   it   if   a  patient  
refuses.58     Also,  Louisiana  employs  the  use  of  the  term  “unborn  
child”  when  referring  to  fetal  life.59  
Louisiana  requires  a  patient  seeking  an  abortion  to  sign  an  
“Ultrasound  Before  Abortion  Notice  and  Election  Form.”60    This  
form   provides   patients   with   important   disclaimers,   including:  
the   right   to   look   away  when   the   ultrasound   provider   displays  
the  ultrasound;   to   listen  to,  or  decline  to   listen  to,   the  heartbeat  
of  the  fetal  life;  to  opt  out  of  the  ultrasound  in  the  event  of  rape  
or   incest;  and  the  option  to  obtain  a  print  depicting  the  unborn  
child.61      The   statute   requires   a   woman   opting   not   to   have   the  
ultrasound  conducted  for  reason  of  rape  or  incest  to  certify  that  
she  has  reported  the  rape  or  incest  to  law  enforcement  officials.62    
Lastly,   the   Louisiana   statute   lists   the   medical   emergency  
exceptions  and  the  civil  penalties  and  other  penalties  for  failure  
of  a  physician  to  comply  with  the  statute.63  
 
   55.     Id.  §§  40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(a),  3(a)-­‐‑(d).  
   56.     Id.  §  40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(b).  
   57.     Id.  (emphasis  added).  
   58.     Id.  §§  40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(a)-­‐‑(b),  3(d).    
   59.     See  generally  id.  §  R.S.  40:1299.35.2.  
   60.     Id.  §  40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(d).  
   61.     Id.  
   62.     Id.    
   63.     Id.  §§  40:1299.35.2(D)(4)(a)-­‐‑(b),  (5)-­‐‑(6)  (Medical  emergency  is  defined  in  the  
statute   as   “the   existence   of   any   physical   condition,   not   including   any   emotional,  
psychological,   or   mental   condition,   which   a   reasonably   prudent   physician,   with  
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SPEECH-­‐‑AND-­‐‑DISPLAY  CASES  
Texas  Medical  Providers  Performing  Abortion  Services  v.  Lakey  
In   Lakey,   the   Fifth   Circuit   addressed   the   issue   of   whether  
Texas   H.B.15   abridges   physicians’   First   Amendment   rights  
against  compelled  speech  by  requiring  them  to  take  and  describe  
a  sonogram  to  patients  seeking  abortions.64     The  court  held  that  
H.B.   15   did   not   violate   physicians’   First   Amendment   rights  
because  the  State  can  play  a  “significant  role  .  .  .  in  regulating  the  
medical   profession[,]”65   and   the   State’s   informed   consent   laws  
are   permissible   if   they   do   not   place   an   undue   burden   on   the  
patient   and   are   “truthful,   non[-­‐‑]misleading,   and   relevant  
disclosures”  that  do  not  constitute  ideological  speech.66  
The  court’s  opinion  outlined  the  major  points  of  contention  
within  Texas  H.B.  15  and   then   immediately  compared   the   facts  
of   Casey   with   the   facts   at   hand.67      The   court   followed   the  
 
knowledge   of   the   case   and   treatment   possibilities   with   respect   to   the   medical  
conditions   involved,  would   determine   necessitates   the   immediate   abortion   of   the  
pregnancy   to   avert   the   pregnant   woman'ʹs   death   or   to   avert   substantial   and  
irreversible   impairment   of   a   major   bodily   function   arising   from   continued  
pregnancy.”).      
   64.     Tex.  Med.  Providers  Performing  Abortion  Servs.  v.  Lakey,  667  F.3d  570,  574  
(5th   Cir.   2012).   The   court   considered   the   First   Amendment   abridgment   issue  
amongst  other  alleged  violations  of  Texas  H.B.  15,  which  are  not   important   to   the  
discussion  in  this  Article.    Id.  at  580-­‐‑84.  
   65.     Id.  at  576  (citing  Gonzales  v.  Carhart,  550  U.S.  124,  157  (2007)).    
   66.     Lakey,   667   F.3d   at   576.      The   physician’s   relevant   disclosures   include   not  
only   the   risks   to   the   patient   but   also   the   risks   to   the   unborn   fetus.      Id.      The  
government  can  use   its  regulatory  authority   to  protect   the   life  of  an  unborn  fetus.    
Id.  (citing  Gonzales,  550  U.S.  at  128).    The  state  has  a  legitimate  interest  in  protecting  
the  rights  of  the  life  within  a  woman.    Id.    Because  Texas  H.B.  15  does  not  fall  within  
“ideological   speech,”   as   it   requires   a   physician   to   provide   objective,   relevant  
information   in  describing  a   sonogram,   it  does  not   receive  a   strict   scrutiny  review;  
rather,   the   state   need   only   have   a   legitimate   state   interest   that   need   not   be  
compelling   or   narrowly   tailored.      Id.      Furthermore,   providing   “truthful,   non[-­‐‑
]misleading  information”  that  is  “relevant”  to  a  patient’s  decision  whether  to  have  
an   abortion   does   not   impose   and   undue   burden   on   a   patient   and   is   permissible  
under   the   Fourteenth  Amendment.      Planned   Parenthood   of   Se.   Pa.   v.   Casey,   505  
U.S.  833,  882  (1992).    
   67.     Lakey,  667  F.3d  at  573-­‐‑74.    The  cases  align  in  that  Casey  required  physicians  
to  provide  patients  seeking  an  abortion  with  the  “probable  gestational  age”  of   the  
fetal   life   and   required   written   consent.   Casey,   505   U.S.   at   881.      Likewise,   Lakey  
required   the   physician   to   provide   a   description   of   a   sonogram   and   a   written  
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precedent   set   in   Casey,   identifying   that   the   First   Amendment  
analysis   in   Casey   was   the   “antithesis”   of   strict   scrutiny.68      In  
doing   so,   the   court   was   able   to   apply   a   more   lenient   tier   of  
scrutiny,   requiring  merely  a   legitimate   state   interest   to   infringe  
upon   a   physician’s   right   not   to   speak   within   the   medical  
profession.69     When  a  physician  is  operating  within  the  medical  
profession,   his   or   her   right   not   to   speak   is   subject   to   the  
regulations  of   the  State.70     Those   regulations,  placing  no  undue  
burden  on  a  patient   seeking  an  abortion  prior   to   fetal  viability,  
need   only   be   truthful,   non-­‐‑misleading,   and   relevant   to   the  
decision  to  perform  an  abortion.71  
The   court   then   cited   Gonzales   to   show   that   among   the  
legitimate   state   interests   in   infringing   upon   a   physician’s   right  
not   to   speak   is   showing  a  “profound  respect   for   life  within   the  
woman.”72      The   court   finalized   its   reasoning   that   requiring  
physicians  to  take  a  sonogram  and  describe  it  to  patients  seeking  
an   abortion   does   not   violate   the   First  Amendment   right   not   to  
speak  by   leaning  on   the  Eighth  Circuit’s   interpretation  of  Casey  
and  Gonzales  in  Rounds.    In  Rounds,  the  Eighth  Circuit  held  that  a  
state  could  use  its  regulatory  authority  to  “require  a  physician  to  
provide   truthful,   non-­‐‑misleading   information   relevant   to   a  
patient’s   decision   to  have   an   abortion,   even   if   that   information  
might   also   encourage   a   patient   to   choose   childbirth   over  
abortion.”73  
 
consent.    Lakey,  667  F.3d  at  574.    
   68.     Lakey,  667  F.3d  at  575.    
   69.     Id.      By   applying   a   rational   basis-­‐‑type   review,   the   court   then   isolated  
physicians’   right  not   to  speak  within   the  medical   field,  which   is   subjected   then   to  
the  “reasonable  licensing  and  regulation  by  the  State[.]”  Id.  (citing  Casey,  505  U.S.  at  
884).    
   70.     Id.    
   71.     See  Casey,  505  U.S.  at  882.  
   72.     Lakey,   667  F.3d  at   576.     This   interest   is   also   supported  with  an   interest   in  
protecting  a  woman  seeking  an  abortion  from  the  potential  physiological  damages  
associated  with  having  an  abortion  and  later  finding  out  new  information  that  may  
have  swayed  a  woman’s  decision  whether  to  have  an  abortion.    Id.  
   73.     Id.  at  576-­‐‑77   (emphasis  omitted).     The  court  also  acknowledged   that  even  
the  dissent   in  Planned  Parenthood  Minn.,  N.D.,  S.D.  v.  Rounds  acknowledged   that  a  
“state’s   reasonable   medical   regulation   of   abortion   includes   its   assertion   of  
‘legitimate  interests   in  the  health  of  the  mother  and  in  protecting  the  potential   life  
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The  court  shifted  to  the  Abortion  Provider’s  contention  with  
Texas  H.B.   15’s  written   consent   requirement.74      The   court   held  
that  this  provision  of  Texas  H.B.  15  was  not  unconstitutional  per  
precedent  set  in  Casey.75    The  court  then  broke  down  the  specific  
objections   of   the   Providers   and   stated   that   a   sonogram   is  
medically  necessary76  and   that   requiring  a  physician   to  directly  
provide   the   information   regarding   a   sonogram,   rather   than  
pointing  a  woman  to  written  information  or  brochures,  in  order  
to   receive   written   consent   is   not   unconstitutional.77      The   court  
reasoned   that   the   “mode   of   delivery   does   not   make   a  
constitutionally   significant   difference   from   the   ‘availability’  
provision   in  Casey.”78      Therefore,   the  written   consent   provision  
of   Texas   H.B.   15   was   held   “sustainable   under   Casey,”   and  
“within   the   State’s   power   to   regulate   the   practice   of  medicine,  
 
within  her.’”    Id.  at  577  (citing  Planned  Parenthood  Minn.,  N.D.,  S.D.  v.  Rounds,  530  
F.3d  724,  741  (8th  Cir.  2008)).  
   74.     Lakey,  667  F.3d  at  578.    
   75.     Id.     The  court  rejected  Providers’  argument   that  any  disclosure  pertaining  
to   the   fetus   beyond   that   of   its   gestational   age   was   “medically   unnecessary[,]”  
amounting   to   “advocacy   by   the   state.”      Id.   at   578-­‐‑79.   The   court   also   rejected  
Provider’s   second   argument   that   distinguished   Casey   from   Lakey   in   that   Casey  
merely   required   the   physician   to   point   the   patient   toward   information,   whereas  
Lakey   requires   physicians   to   provide   the   information,   making   the   physicians   a  
“mouthpiece”  for  the  State.    Id.  at  579.  The  court  rejected  this  argument,  as  well,  and  
lumped   the   two   arguments   of   Providers   together   to   state   that   Providers   were  
interpreting  Casey   to   place   a   “ceiling”   on   informed   consent   regulations.      Id.      The  
court  advised  that  the  federal  courts  provide  principles  of  law,  not  a  “repository  for  
regulation  of  the  practice  of  medicine.”    Id.  
   76.     The   only   way   a   sonogram   is   medically   unnecessary   is   if   a   pregnancy   is  
treated  as  a  “condition  to  be  terminated.”    Id.  at  579.    Informed  consent  is  a  measure  
used   to   provide   a   patient   with   enough   information   to  make   a   sound   decision;   a  
sonogram   provides   a   patient   with   the   necessary   information   to   make   a   decision  
about  an  abortion,  and  the  potential  effect  of  discouraging  an  abortion  is  acceptable.    
Id.  
   77.     Id.  
   78.     Id.      In   Casey,   the   physicians   merely   had   to   inform   the   patient   of   the  
availability  of  printed  information.  Planned  Parenthood  of  Se.  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U.S.  
833,   881   (1992).      In  Lakey,   the   physicians  were   required   to   directly   converse  with  
their   patients   about   each   patient’s   sonogram.      Lakey,   667   F.3d   at   579.      The   court  
reasoned   that   the   only   difference   between   the   two   cases   is   the   “mode”   of  
transmitting   the   information,   which   is   constitutionally   insignificant.      Id.      The  
analysis  in  Casey  regarded  requiring  physicians  to  provide  specific  information,  not  
how  it  was  provided.    Id.    The  court  further  supported  its  reasoning  by  stating  that  
Wooley  was  unconcerned  with  how  the  state  compelled  speech,  but  rather,  the  court  
was  concerned  with  the  content  of  the  compelled  speech.    Id.  at  580.    
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and   therefore   [does]   not   violate   the   First   Amendment.”79      The  
court   vacated   “the   district   court’s   preliminary   injunction,”   and  
remanded   “for   further   proceedings   consistent   with   [its]  
opinion.”80  
Stuart  v.  Huff  
The   key   issue   facing   the   North   Carolina   District   Court   in  
Stuart  v.  Huff  was  whether  the  petitioners  were  likely  to  succeed  
on   a   First   Amendment   objection   to   the   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  
requirements,  which  constitute  compelled  speech,  so  as  to  grant  
a  preliminary  injunction  while  the  pending  constitutional  issues  
are   being   resolved.81      The   petitioners   brought   a   First  
Amendment   objection   to   the   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   requirements,  
contending  that  the  State  was  “compelling  unwilling  speakers  to  
deliver  the  state’s  message  discouraging  abortion[s].”82  
The  court  deemed  the  speech  ideological  and  applied  strict  
scrutiny  analysis,  which  resulted  in  the  granting  of  a  preliminary  
injunction.83      The   court   held   that   the   State   did   not   have   a  
compelling   interest   in   compelling   physician’s   speech,   and   that  
the   means   used   to   meet   state   interest   were   not   shown   to   be  
narrowly   tailored.84      The   court   reasoned   that   First  Amendment  
 
   79.     Id.      The   court   also   ruled   on   the   constitutionality   contention   from   the  
Providers   that   the   provisions   of   Texas   H.B.   15   were   vague,   holding   that   the  
Providers  could  not  support  this  claim.    Id.  at  584.    
   80.     Id.    
   81.     Stuart  v.  Huff,  834  F.  Supp.2d  424,  426-­‐‑27  (M.D.N.C.  2011).      The  court  held  
that  the  void-­‐‑for-­‐‑vagueness  claim  was  unlikely  to  succeed.    Id.  at  427.    Yet,  the  court  
did  not  address  the  substantive  due  process  claim  and  the  vagueness  claim  in  that  
same  section  because  it  was  unnecessary  given  that  the  First  Amendment  claim  was  
held  to  be  likely  to  succeed  on  the  merits.    Id.  
   82.     Id.  at  428.    N.C.  GEN.  STAT.    §  90-­‐‑21.85  required  that  a  “qualified  technician  
working   with   the   physician”   display   the   ultrasound   taken   at   least   twenty-­‐‑four  
hours  prior  to  performing  the  abortion  in  a  manner  “so  that  the  patient  may  view  
[it].    Id.  (citing  N.C.  GEN.  STAT.  §  90-­‐‑21.85(a)(2)-­‐‑(4)  (2011)).  The  technician  must  then  
explain   the   ultrasound   to   the   patient,   highlighting   the   “‘presence,   location,   and  
dimensions  of   the  unborn   child  within   the  uterus’…and  a   ‘medical  description  of  
the   images,   which   shall   include   the   dimensions   of   the   embryo   or   fetus   and   the  
presence   of   external  members   and   internal   organs,   if   present   and   viewable.’”   Id.  
(citing  N.C.  GEN.  STAT.  §  90-­‐‑21.85(a)(2)-­‐‑(4)  (2011)).  
   83.     Id.  at  429-­‐‑32.  
   84.     Id.  at  432.    
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protections  were  triggered  and  that  strict  scrutiny  applied.85  
Furthermore,   the   court   discounted   an   argument   for  
intermediate   scrutiny,   which   the   Supreme   Court   applies   to  
“compelled   speech   in   the   ordinary   informed-­‐‑consent   context,  
given   the   historical   interest   the   state   has   in   regulating   certain  
aspects   of  medical   care.”86      The   court   also   discounted   all   three  
compelling  state  interests  proffered  by  the  defendants.87    Lastly,  
the   court   discounted   the   statute   because   the   burden   placed   on  
speech  was  not  narrowly  tailored  to  promote  a  compelling  state  
interest.88  
Planned  Parenthood  Minnesota,  North  Dakota,  South  Dakota  v.  
Rounds  
The   Eighth   Circuit   interpreted   Casey   and   Gonzales   and  
determined   that   it   is  not   unconstitutional   compelled   speech   to  
expand   informed  consent   to  entail   information  about  a   fetus   in  
addition   to   risks   to   a   patient.89      The   pertinent   issues   in  Rounds  
were   whether   the   information   physicians   were   compelled   to  
 
   85.     Id.   at   429.      It   was   uncontested   that   the   speech   the   statute   required   was  
compelled;  however,   the  court  based   its   reasoning   for  applying  strict   scrutiny  not  
on   compelled   speech   alone,   but   on   compelled   ideological   speech,   as   provided   by  
the  United  States  Supreme  Court  in  Wooley.    Id.  (citing  generally  Wooley  v.  Maynard,  
430  U.S.  705  (1977)).    
   86.     Id.  at  431   (citing  Whalen  v.  Roe,  429  U.S.  589,  603  n.30   (1997)).     The  court  
distinguished   the  North  Carolina   statute’s   informed  consent   from   that  which  was  
deemed  ordinary  in  Whalen,  as  the  North  Carolina  statute  required  a  “physician  to  
physically  speak  and  show  the  state’s  non-­‐‑medical  message  to  patients  unwilling  to  
hear  or  see  [it].”  Id.  at  432  (emphasis  added)  (citing  Whalen,  429  U.S.  at  603  n.  30).    
   87.     Id.   at   432.      The   three   compelling   interests   proffered  were   “[(1)]protecting  
the  psychological  health  of  the  patient,  [(2)]  preventing  coercive  abortions,  and  [(3)]  
expressing  its  preference  for  the  life  of  the  unborn.”  Id.  at  428.  The  court  held  that  
even  if  the  first  interest  were  compelling,  the  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  requirement  does  
not  further  them.    Id.  at  432.     The  court  said  the  same  of  the  second  interest,  again  
not   deciding  whether   the   interest  was   compelling.      Id.      Of   the   third   interest,   the  
court  deferred   to  Casey,   stating   that   nowhere   in  Casey  does   the  Court   state   that   a  
preference  for  the  life  of  the  unborn  is  a  compelling  interest.    Id.  
   88.     Id.   at   428-­‐‑32   (citing   no   authority   for   this   proportionality   analysis).      The  
court  rejected  the  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  requirement  because   the  defendants  did  not  
show   that   alternatives,   such   as   writing   information   and   speech   without   display,  
that  were  more  in  proportion  to  the  burden  on  speech  were  not  viable  options.    Id.  
at  432.    
   89.     Id.  at  428-­‐‑36.    
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convey  to  a  patient  by  a  South  Dakota  statute  were  ideological,90  
untruthful,   misleading,   or   not   relevant   to   the   decision   of   an  
abortion,   and   if   that   compelled   speech   violated   a   physician’s  
First   Amendment   right   not   to   speak.91      Planned   Parenthood  
challenged   that   statutory   language   that   required   physicians   to  
state   that   the   abortion   would   “terminate   the   life   of   a   whole,  
separate,   unique,   living   human   being”92   as   being   ideological  
speech   because,   they   contended,   a   fetus   is   not   a   “whole,  
separate,  unique  living  being”  as  a  matter  of  scientific  or  medical  
fact.93      The   statute,   however,   defined   “human   being”   as   “an  
individual   living   member   of   the   species   of   Homo   sapiens  .  .  .  
during  [its]  embryonic  [or]  fetal  age[].”94  
The  court   in  Rounds  held   that  Planned  Parenthood  did  not  
meet  its  burden  “to  produce  sufficient  evidence  to  establish  that  
it   is   likely   to   prevail   on   the   merits   of   its   compelled   speech  
claim.”95      The   compelled   speech   was   not   unconstitutional,   as  
Planned   Parenthood   “fail[ed]   to   give   effect   to   the   statutory  
definition   of   ‘human  being’”   in  .  .  .   the  Act.”96      Interpreting   the  
holdings  in  Gonzales  and  Casey,  the  court  reasoned  that  the  State  
“can   use   its   regulatory   authority   to   require   a   physician   to  
provide   truthful,   non-­‐‑misleading   information   relevant   to   a  
patient’s   decision   to  have   an   abortion,   even   if   that   information  
might   also   encourage   a   patient   to   choose   childbirth   over  
 
   90.     Ideological  speech  is  defined  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  as  speech  
that  conveys  a  “point  of  view.”    Wooley  v.  Maynard,  430  U.S.  705,  715  (1977).    
   91.     Planned   Parenthood  Minn.,   N.D.,   S.D.   v.   Rounds,   530   F.3d   724,   727   (8th  
Cir.  2008).     South  Dakota  Legislature  had  enacted  House  Bill  1166,  which  required  
physicians  performing  an  abortion  to  provide  a  statement  twenty-­‐‑four  hours  prior  
to   conducting   an   abortion   that   informed   the   patient   that   the   abortion   would  
“terminate  the  life  of  a  whole,  separate,  unique,  living  human  being.”  Id.  at  726.  It  
also  provided  that  physicians  inform  the  patient  that  the  “pregnant  woman  has  an  
existing   relationship  with   that  unborn  human  being   .   .   .,”  and   that  “by  having  an  
abortion,  her  existing  relationship  .  .  .  will  be  terminated.”  Id.  at  726-­‐‑727.  
   92.     Id.  at  726.  
   93.     Id.  at  727-­‐‑228.  The  court  discussed  the  definition  of  a  human  being  in  detail;  
however,  because   the   statute  defined  human  beings,  per  Meese   v.  Keene,   the   court  
“must   follow   that  definition.”   Id.  at  728,  735   (citing  Meese  v.  Keene,  481  U.S.   465,  
484-­‐‑85  (1987)).  
   94.     Id.  at  735-­‐‑36.  
   95.     Id.  at  737.    
   96.     Id.  at  737-­‐‑38.  
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abortion.”97      The   language   in   the   statute   deeming   a   fetus   as   a  
“whole,   separate,   unique,   living   human   being”   did   not  
encompass  an  ideological  message  of   the  State,  and,  when  read  
with   the   provided   statutory   definition   of   “human   being,”   did  
not   consist  of  untruthful,   irrelevant,  or  misleading   information,  
which   Planned   Parenthood   would   have   had   to   show   to  
successfully   prove   that   the   compelled   speech   was  
unconstitutional.98     Because   the   compelled   speech  was   truthful,  
non-­‐‑misleading,  and  relevant   to   the  patient’s  abortion  decision,  
the   narrowly   tailored   action   constitutionally   furthered   the  
State’s  compelling  interest  of  protecting  fetal  life.99  
CONSTITUTIONAL  MODEL  LEGISLATION  THAT  PROMOTES  GOOD  
PUBLIC  POLICY  
Because   clear   depictions   of   ultrasounds   promote   clear  
decisions   of   patients   seeking   an   abortion,   it   is   essential   that  
states   wishing   to   protect   patients’   mental   health   and   fetal   life  
draft   legislation   that   passes   First   and   Fourteenth   Amendment  
muster.      It   is   also   essential   that   states   draft   legislation   that   is  
good   public   policy.      The   model   statute   that   I   propose   in   the  
Appendix   strikes   a   middle   ground   for   pro-­‐‑life   and   pro-­‐‑choice  
camps,   so  women’s   health   and   fetal   life   are   protected  without  
infringing  upon  a  patient’s  or  a  physician’s  rights.    By  leveraging  
the  attempts  that  some  states  have  taken  at  drafting  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑
display   legislation,   I   propose   a   model   statute   for   states  
attempting  to  adopt  a  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statute  of  their  own.100    
The   five   key   features   of   the   model   statute   are   (1)   the   type   of  
ultrasound  required,  (2)  employing  “fetal  life”  in  describing  the  
 
   97.     Id.  at  734-­‐‑35.    
   98.     Id.  at  735-­‐‑36.    
   99.     Id.  at  734-­‐‑36.    
   100.     Louisiana  and  Texas  provide  the  most  comprehensive  attempts  at  drafting  
speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statutes.  Four  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statutes  have  been  subjected  
to   litigation  (North  Carolina,  North  Dakota,  Oklahoma,  and  Texas).     See,  e.g.,  N.C.  
GEN.  STAT.  §  90-­‐‑21.82(1)(e)  (2011);  N.D.  CENT.  CODE  §  14-­‐‑02.1;  OKLA.  STAT.  ANN.  tit.  
63   §   1-­‐‑738.2(a)   (West   2004   &   Supp.   2012);   TEX.   HEALTH   &   SAFETY   CODE   ANN.  
§171.012(4)(B)  (West  2010  &  Supp.  2012).  
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ultrasound  image,  (3)  authorizing  a  broad  range  of  providers  to  
perform  the  ultrasound,  (4)  exceptions  for  those  required  to  have  
an  ultrasound  displayed  and  described  prior  to  an  abortion,  and  
(5)   the   election   form  physicians  must  provide   and  have   signed  
by  a  patient.  
ELEMENTS  OF  THE  MODEL  STATUTE  
The  type  of  ultrasound  and  description  that  must  be  provided  
The   model   statute   provides   that   an   ultrasound   provider  
should   take   a   non-­‐‑invasive   ultrasound,   display   it,   and  
simultaneously   describe   it   to   a   patient   as   part   of   obtaining  
informed   consent.      The   required   ultrasound   shall   provide   a  
patient  with  a  real-­‐‑time  view  of  the  fetus  by  way  of  an  obstetric  
ultrasound,101   or,   if   a   patient   chooses,   a   transvaginal  
ultrasound.102      The   real-­‐‑time   view   must   be   the   obstetric  
ultrasound  with  the  option  of  having  a  transvaginal  ultrasound,  
and   it   should  not   contain   language   that   requires  an  ultrasound  
“consistent  with  current  medical  practice”103  unless  the  language  
is   qualified   to   provide   that   a   transvaginal   ultrasound   or   other  
invasive   procedures   cannot   be   required   by   the   State   but   may  
only  be  opted  into  by  a  patient.104     There  are  limited  grounds  to  
object   to   a   transabdominal,   obstetric   ultrasound   because   it   is   a  
 
   101.     N.C.   GEN.   STAT.   §   90-­‐‑21.82(1)(e)   (2011);   The   Louisiana   statute   offers   to  
“simultaneously  display   the  screen  which  depicts   the  active  ultrasound   images  so  
that  the  pregnant  woman  may  view  them.”  2012  LA.  ACTS  685  (S.B.  708)  supra  note  
51,  §  40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(a);  Offering  to  show  the  ultrasound  falls  short  of  requiring  
that   it  be  shown  in   that   the   information  may  not  be  conveyed,   thus,  defeating  the  
purpose  of  informed  consent.     The  North  Carolina  statute  goes  too  far  in  deeming  
the  displayed  image  an  “unborn  child,”  which,  as  discussed  infra,  may  be  deemed  
ideological  speech.      N.C.  GEN.  STAT.  §  90-­‐‑21.82(1)(e)  (2011).  
   102.     To   provide   a   patient  with   full   autonomy   over   her   reproductive   decision,  
the   choice   of   a   transvaginal   or   transabdominal   ultrasound   should   be   offered,   but  
only  the  transabdominal  should  be  required.    
   103.     TEX.   HEALTH   &   SAFETY   CODE   ANN.   §171.012(4)(B)   (West   2010   &   Supp.  
2012)   contains   this   language,  which  was   upheld   in  Tex.  Med.   Providers   Performing  
Abortion  Servs.  v.  Lakey.  667  F.3d  570,  577,  584  (5th  Cir.  2012).    
   104.     This   provides   a   safeguard   from   the   State   promulgating   an   invasive  
ultrasound  requirement  by  relying  on  the  current  medical  practice  as  a  guide,  while  
allowing  for  the  statute  to  naturally  update  with  technological  innovations.    
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reasonable,   less   invasive,   alternative   procedure;   thus,   a   statute  
with  this  requirement  is  more  likely  to  be  efficiently  enacted.105  
The   public   has   already   displayed   its   sentiments   toward  
attempts   of   the  Alabama   and  Virginia   legislatures106   to   require  
transvaginal   ultrasounds,   with   some   critics   deeming   the  
procedure  state-­‐‑mandated  rape.107    Unless  a  patient  opts  to  have  a  
 
   105.     Limited   grounds   may   include   medical   emergencies   and   geographical  
constraints.    Planned  Parenthood,  for  example,  will  not  provide  an  abortion  without  
first   conducting   an  ultrasound.  Alana  Goodman,  Planned  Parenthood   Says   it  Won’t  
Do   Abortions   Without   Ultrasounds,   COMMENTARY   MAG.   (Feb.   22,   2012),  
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/02/22/planned-­‐‑parenthood-­‐‑abortions-­‐‑
ultrasounds/.   “That’s   just   the   medical   standard,”   said   Adrienne   Schreiber,   an  
official  at  Planned  Parenthood’s  Washington,  D.C.,  regional  office.  Id.;  “To  confirm  
the   gestational   age   of   the   pregnancy,   before   any   procedure   is   done,   you   do   an  
ultrasound.”   Id.;   Planned   Parenthood’s   “What   Happens   During   an   In-­‐‑Clinic  
Abortion?”  write-­‐‑up   contains   a   clause   that   says   the   patient  will   “have   a   physical  
exam  –which  may   include   an  ultrasound.”  What  Happens  During   an  Abortion   -­‐‑   In-­‐‑
Clinic   Abortion   Cost,   PLANNED   PARENTHOOD,   http://www.plannedparenthood.org/  
health-­‐‑topics/abortion/in-­‐‑clinic-­‐‑abortion-­‐‑procedures-­‐‑4359.asp   (last   visited   Nov.   8,  
2013);   “May   include   an  ultrasound”   is  misleading   in   that   a   patient  must   have   an  
ultrasound  prior  to  any  abortion  procedure  to  determine  the  gestational  age  of  the  
fetus.  
   106.     Alabama  Senator  Scofield  proposed   legislation   that   required   that  prior   to  
conducting  an  abortion,  a  physician  must  “[p]erform  an  obstetric  ultrasound  on  the  
pregnant   woman,   using   either   a   vaginal   transducer   or   an   abdominal   transducer,  
whichever  would  display  the  embryo  or  fetus  more  clearly.”  S.B.  12,  Reg.  Sess.  (Al.  
2012);  By  requiring  the  ultrasound  that  displays  the  embryo  or  fetus  more  clearly,  a  
patient  may   be   subjected   to   an   invasive   procedure  without   her   consent.   Virginia  
had  previously   attempted   to  do   the   same   in  House  Bill   462.     However,  Gov.  Bob  
McDonnell   revoked  his   support   of  HB  462’s   transvaginal  ultrasound   requirement  
stating  that,  “Mandating  an  invasive  procedure  in  order  to  give  informed  consent  is  
not   a   proper   role   for   the   state[.]   No   person   should   be   directed   to   undergo   an  
invasive  procedure  by  the  state,  without  their  consent,  as  a  precondition  to  another  
medical   procedure.”   Laura   Bassett,   Virginia   Ultrasound   Bill   Passes   in   House,  
HUFFINGTON   POST   (Feb.   22,   2012),   http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/22/  
virginia-­‐‑ultrasound-­‐‑bill-­‐‑abortion_n_1294026.html.  
   107.     Senator   Linda   Coleman,   an   Alabama   Democrat,   sums   up   the   sentiment  
nicely  by  stating,  “You  can’t  tell  me  forcing  a  probe  into  a  woman’s  vagina  against  
her  consent  is  anything  but  rape…You  can  put  icing  on  it,  dress  it  up,  but  this  is  the  
forced   penetration   of   a   woman'ʹs   vagina   without   her   consent.”   Tyler   Kingkade,  
Alabama   Picks   Up  Where   Virginia   Left   Off  With   Ultrasound   Law,   CAMPUS   PROGRESS  
(March   1,   2012),   http://campusprogress.org/articles/alabama_picks_up_  
where_virginia_left_on_with_ultrasound_law/;   An   argument   can   be   made   that  
nonconsensual   penetration   of   a   woman’s   vagina   without   the   existence   of   an  
emergency,   albeit   for  medical   purposes,   could   legally   constitute   sexual   battery   in  
Mississippi,  for  example.  “A  person  is  guilty  of  sexual  battery  if  he  or  she  engages  
in   sexual   penetration  with:   another   person  without   his   or   her   consent.   .   .”  MISS.  
CODE   ANN.   §   97-­‐‑3-­‐‑95(1)   (1973-­‐‑2006);   Sexual   penetration   is   defined   including  
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transvaginal  ultrasound,  a  transabdominal  ultrasound  suffices  to  
determine   the   information   necessary   for   a   patient   to   make   an  
informed   decision   without   triggering   a   strong,   emotional  
response  from  the  public.  
Employing  “fetal  life”  in  describing  the  ultrasound  image  
Chief  among  the  required  speech  is  that  a  fetus  depicted  in  
the   ultrasound   be   referred   to   as   a   “fetal   life”   rather   than   an  
“unborn  child”108  or  a  “potential  life,”109  which  should  minimize  
the   statute’s   exposure   to   succumbing   to   strict   scrutiny   analysis  
 
“cunnilingus,  fellatio,  buggery  or  pederasty,  any  penetration  of  the  genital  or  anal  
openings  of  another  person'ʹs  body  by  any  part  of  a  person'ʹs  body,  and  insertion  of  
any  object  into  the  genital  or  anal  openings  of  another  person'ʹs  body.”  MISS.  CODE  
ANN.  §  97-­‐‑3-­‐‑97(a);  Advocates   for   the   transvaginal  ultrasound  posit   that   it   is  often  
used  in  the  first  trimester  of  pregnancy  because  it  is  “the  most  effective  method  for  
viewing  early-­‐‑stage  pregnancies,”  and  it  is  likely  to  be  used  despite  legislation  as  a  
means  to  “date  their  pregnancies.”    Carole  Joffe,  Crying  Rape,  SLATE  (Feb.  29,  2012),  
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2012/02/transvaginal_ultrasounds
_why_pro_choice_advocates_shouldn_t_call_them_rape_.html;   Joffe   further   states,  
“In   the   end,   whether   an   ultrasound   is   performed,   and   which   method   is   used,  
reflects   either   the   practice   of   the   abortion   provider,   the   patient’s  medical   history,  
or—for   a   relatively   small   number   of   women—an   aversion   to   the   transvaginal  
method.  Most   of   the   time,   however,   the   transvaginal   ultrasound   is   a   useful   and  
common  tool   that  helps  providers  perform  abortions  safely  and  well.”   Id.  Because  
the   procedure   is   commonly   used   out   of   medical   necessity,   state-­‐‑mandated   rape   is  
likely  a  harsh  misnomer;  however,  if  consent  to  the  procedure  is  given  by  the  state  
rather  than  the  patient,  patient’s  will  be  justified  in  feeling  violated.  Id.    
   108.     Because  the  term  “unborn  child”  is  also  medically  and  legally  cognizable  as  
an  objectively  accurate  term  of  fetal  life,  states  may  desire  to  use  it.     However,  the  
term   is  not  narrowly  construed   to  be  as  objective  as  possible  because   it  opens   the  
debate  as  to  whether  a  fetus  is  a  child,  among  other  connotations.    At  the  very  least,  
“unborn  child”  should  be  used  in  conjunction  with  either  “fetal  life”  or  “fetus,”  but  
never   in   isolation,   so   as   to   circumvent   the   threat   of   becoming   ideological   speech.    
Again,   states   can   circumvent   this   issue   entirely   by   simply   employing   the   use   of  
“fetal  life,”  as  seen  in  the  model  statute.    
   109.     The  term  “potential  life”  is  employed  throughout  Roe  v.  Wade,    410  U.S.  113  
(1973).  However,  “potential   life”   is  not  a  narrowly  construed   term   to  describe   the  
image  because  the  fetus  is  living;  thus,  it  is  actual  life.    Pro-­‐‑life  legislators  may  raise  
an  objection  to  the  usage  of  this  term  because  it  does  not  suggest  that  a  life-­‐‑form  is  
being  terminated.    Furthermore,  there  is  room  for  debate  as  to  when  the  fetus  gains  
the   potential   to   become   a   “human   life.”      To   avoid   unnecessary   debate,   the   term  
“potential  life”  should  be  avoided.  
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for   ideological   speech110   because   it   is   non-­‐‑ideological   and  
medically  accurate.      In  Gonzales,   Justice  Kennedy  employed   the  
term   “fetal   life.”111      Justices   O’Connor   and   Souter   also   use   the  
term  “fetal  life”  in  Casey.112    Whether  the  fetus  is  a  human  being  
constitutes  one  of  the  central  and  highly  contested  issues  in  the  
abortion   debate.      Whereas,   it   is   uncontroverted   that   a   healthy  
fetus   is   living,   which   can   be   confirmed   by   an   ultrasound.113    
Because   there   is  no  doubt  as   to  whether   there   is   a   fetus  within  
the  patient’s  womb  and  that   it   is   living,   though  not  on  its  own,  
the   term  “fetal   life”   is  objectively  accurate  and  does  not   trigger  
ideological  speech  concerns.  
Lastly,   to   promote   the   goals   of   the   legislature   while  
maintaining   objectivity,   all   disclosures   made   by   ultrasound  
providers  are  to  be  made  orally114  “in  a  manner  understandable  
to   a   layperson.”115      While   it   is   constitutional   to   compel   an  
 
   110.     Ideological   speech  would   trigger   strict   scrutiny,   the   very   thing   that  may  
invalidate  the  statute.    See  generally  Wooley  v.  Maynard,  430  U.S.  705  (1977);  “Fetal  
life”   is   a   purely   scientific.      The   Louisiana,  North  Carolina,  Oklahoma,   and   Texas  
statutes   regarding   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   fail   in   providing   “objectively   accurate”  
information   in   the   language   they   employ,   especially   in   their   use   of   the   term  
“unborn  child.”  See  generally  N.C.  GEN.  STAT.  §  90-­‐‑21.82   (2011);  2012  LA.  ACTS  685  
(S.B.  708)  supra  note  51;  TEX.  HEALTH  &  SAFETY  CODE  §  171.012(a)(3)(iii)  (West  2010  
&  Supp.  2012);  OKLA.  STAT.  ANN.  tit.  63  §  1-­‐‑738.2(a)  (West  2004  &  Supp.  2012);  The  
phrase  “unborn  child”  is,   in   itself,  seemingly  contradictory.  Although  Black’s  Law  
Dictionary  defines  an  unborn  child  as  “a  child  not  yet  born,”  how  exactly  is  “child”  
defined?   BLACK’S   LAW   DICTIONARY   233   (7th   ed.   1999);   The   debate   over   the  
definition   of   child   is   worthy   of   its   own   article,   and   the   issue   can   be   avoided   by  
employing  terminology  that  is  equally  effective  in  meeting  the  state’s  goals  without  
infringing   on   ideological   speech;   therefore,   the   term   “unborn   child”   should   be  
avoided  in  favor  of  a  term  that  evokes  a  lesser  ideological  connotation.    
   111.     See  generally  Gonzales  v.  Carhart,  550  U.S.  124  (2007).    
   112.     Planned  Parenthood  of  Se.  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U.S.  833,  860  (1992).    
   113.     Fetal   Ultrasound,   JOHNS   HOPKINS   MED.   HEALTH   LIBRARY,  
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/healthlibrary/test_procedures/gynecology/fetal_u
ltrasound_92,P09031  (last  visited  Nov.  8,  2013).  
   114.     The   ultrasound   providers   must   verbally   provide   the   information   during  
the   consultation,   and  not   by  means   of   a   tape   recording   or   similar   device.     OKLA.  
STAT.  ANN.  tit.  63  §  1-­‐‑738.2(B)(1)(c)  (West  2004  &  Supp.  2012-­‐‑2013);     All  disclosure  
must   be   personalized   to   further   the   State’s   legitimate   interest   in   protecting   the  
mental  health  of  the  patient.    Casey,  505  U.S.  at  846;    To  protect  the  specific  patient,  it  
is  essential   that  each  specific  patient  receive  personalized  information  because  she  
is  make  the  decision  for  herself,  not  society  as  a  whole.      
   115.     TEX.   HEALTH   &   SAFETY   CODE   ANN.   §171.012(4)(c)   (West   2010   &   Supp.  
2012).  
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ultrasound   provider   to   provide   the   information   as   part   of   a  
reasonable   regulation   of   the   medical   profession,116   a   patient  
maintains   the   right   to   look   away   or   tune   out   the   information  
provided117   to   avoid   creating   an   undue   burden.      A   patient  
should   also   be   informed   that   she   could   opt   out   of   having   an  
abortion  at  any  time.118  
Providers  authorized  to  perform  the  ultrasound  
The   category   of   individuals   capable   of   providing   an  
ultrasound   is  broad   to  prevent   creating  an  undue  burden   for   a  
patient   in   obtaining   an   ultrasound.119      The   model   statute  
provides  a  comprehensive  model  by  authorizing  “the  physician  
who  is  to  perform  the  abortion  or  a  qualified  person  who  is  the  
physician’s  agent”120  to  perform  the  ultrasound.    The  authorized  
individuals   hereinafter   are   referred   to   as   “ultrasound  
providers.”   The   ultrasound   serves   the   purpose   of   providing   a  
physician  with   the  gestational  age  of   the   fetus,  and  a  physician  
need   not   personally   take   the   ultrasound   to   obtain   that  
information.    However,  a  professional  who  takes  the  ultrasound  
must   be   medically   qualified   to   describe   the   ultrasound   to   a  
patient   to   make   the   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statute   effective;  
therefore,  the  limitations  provided  by  the  Louisiana  statute  serve  
as  a  safeguard  against  misinformation.  
 
   116.     See  generally  Casey,  505  U.S.  833.      
   117.     2012  LA.  ACTS  685  (S.B.  708)  supra  note  51,  §  40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(d)(1).    
   118.     N.C.  GEN.  STAT.  §  90-­‐‑21.82(2)(e)  (2011).  
   119.     Mississippi   and   Louisiana,   for   example,   only   have   one   abortion   clinic   in  
their   entire   states,   respectively.   How   can   I   find   a   provider   near   me?      NAT’L  
ABORTION   FED’N,   http://www.prochoice.org/Pregnant/find/ms.html   (last   visited  
Jan.   4,   2013);   How   can   I   find   a   provider   near   me?   NAT’L   ABORTION   FED’N,    
http://www.prochoice.org/pregnant/find/Louisiana.html   (last   visited   Jan.   4,   2013);  
Therefore,  an  overly  broad  limitation  on  who  might  provide  an  ultrasound  makes  a  
statute   constitutionally   null   by   way   of   creating   an   undue   burden   on   patients  
seeking  an  abortion.    See  generally  Casey,  505  U.S.  833.  
   120.     2012  LA.  ACTS  685  (S.B.  708)  supra  note  51,  §  40:1299.35.2(D)(1).  
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Exceptions  for  those  required  to  have  an  ultrasound  displayed  and  
described  prior  to  an  abortion  
As   a   matter   of   good   public   policy,   the   model   statute  
provides   for   necessary   exceptions   to   requiring   the   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑
display  of  an  ultrasound  prior  to  an  abortion,  including  medical  
emergencies,   rape  and   incest  exceptions,  other  criminal  activity  
exceptions,  and  distance  exceptions.121  
The  election  form  physicians  must  provide  and  have  signed  by  the  
patient  
To   ensure   that   physicians   comply   with   the   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑
display   requirements   and   to   ensure   that   a   patient   is   fully  
informed,   the   model   statute   requires   that   an   election   form   be  
signed  by  the  patient  and  filed  by  the  ultrasound  provider  prior  
to   having   the   ultrasound   performed.      This   creates   an   open  
dialogue  between  an  ultrasound  provider  and  a  patient.     It  also  
prevents   tangential   legal   issues   as   created   by   some   of   the  
previous  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statutes.122  
 
   121.     Although  there  are  a  multitude  of  reasons  for  obtaining  an  abortion,  certain  
reasons  are  of  a  particular  sensitivity,  namely  those  that  are  motivated  by  a  criminal  
activity   for  which   the  patient  seeking   the  abortion  was,  and  still   is,  a  victim.     The  
model  statute  is  sensitive  to  this  fact  by  providing  exceptions  to  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  
statutes  for  victims  of  rape  or  incest.    The  model  statute  also  provides  exceptions  for  
medical   emergencies,   and   it  provides   exceptions   for  geographical  distance,  which  
would  prevent  creating  an  undue  burden  on  a  woman  living  in  a  state  in  which  the  
nearest   abortion   provider   is   located   more   than   100   miles   away   from   her   home.  
While  the  patient  is  still  required  to  have  an  ultrasound  prior  to  having  an  abortion,  
she  is  not  required  to  have  the  burden  of  having  it  at  least  twenty-­‐‑four  hours  prior  
to   having   the   abortion.      TEX.  HEALTH  &   SAFETY  CODE  ANN.   §171.012(a)(2)(C),   (4)  
(West  2010  &  Supp.  2012).  
   122.     For  example,   the  Louisiana  statute  runs  afoul  because   it  only  provides  an  
exception  to  an  ultrasound  for  women  who  are  victims  of  rape  or  incest  “who  have  
reported   the   act   to   law   enforcement   reports.”   2012   LA.   ACTS   685   (S.B.   708)   supra  
note  51,  §  40:1299.35.2(E).  It  does  not  provide  an  exception  to  the  consent  form  for  
individuals   who   are   victim   of   a   crime   but   have   not   reported   because   she   has   a  
reasonable  belief  that  reporting  the  crime  would  expose  her  to  the  risk  of  retaliation  
resulting  in  serious  bodily  harm,  like  the  Texas  statute.  See  id.;  see  also  TEX.  HEALTH  
&   SAFETY  CODE  ANN.   §   171.012(a)(2)(C);   The   Louisiana   statute   currently   requires  
that   a  woman   report   rape  or   incest   to  meet   the  medical   exception.   2012  LA.  ACTS  
685  (S.B.  708),  supra  note  51,  at  §  40:1299.35.2(E).  Coercing  a  victim  of  rape  or  incest  
into   reporting   the   crime   to  obtain  an  abortion   is   contrary   to   the  goal  of  obtaining  
informed  consent  in  an  effort  to  bolster  the  patient’s  autonomy  because  it  strips  her  
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HOW  THE  ELEMENTS  PROMOTE  GOOD  PUBLIC  POLICY  
By   providing   a   clear   depiction   of   an   ultrasound   and  
simultaneously   describing   the   ultrasound   to   a   patient,   a   state  
can   be   certain   that   it   has   furthered   its   legitimate   interest   in  
protecting   the   mental   health   of   the   patient   and   fetal   life   by  
informing  a  patient  to  an  extent  to  which  she  can  truly  make  an  
autonomous  decision  whether  to  have  an  abortion.    For  a  patient  
to   fully   understand   the   implications   of   her   decision   so   as   to  
protect  her  mental  health,  the  ultrasound  she  views  must  be  live,  
as   a   stagnant   view   of   her   own   ultrasound   or   that   of   another’s  
would  not  be  proportional  to  the  procedure  or  the  weight  of  her  
decision.123     Furthermore,   the  model  statute  avoids  unnecessary  
complications   by   taking   additional   measures,   such   as   not  
requiring  a  physician  to  provide  a  patient  with  a  photograph  of  
the   ultrasound124   and   by   only   requiring   a   physician   to   offer   to  
make  audible  the  heart  auscultations  for  a  patient  to  hear  but  not  
requiring  it  unless  she  specifically  requests  it  as  part  of  obtaining  
informed  consent.125  
 
of  the  very  autonomy  the  State  is  reporting  to  promote.    
   123.     The  live  ultrasound  displays  an  image  of  the  fetus,  and,  assuming  the  fetus  
is  healthy  and  living,  at  no  point  prior  to  the  completion  of  the  procedure  will  the  
fetus   be   anything  other   than   live   and  developing.     When   a   sperm  unites  with   an  
ovum,  a  diploid   cell   is   formed.      STEDMAN’S  MED.  DICTIONARY  1422   (3d  ed.   1972).    
Diploid  denotes  “the  state  of  a  cell  containing  twice  the  normal  gametic  number  of  
chromosomes,  one  member  of  each  chromosome  pair  derived  from  the  father  and  
one  from  the  mother…”  Id.  at  356.  A  cell  is  “the  living,  active  basis  of  all  plant  and  
animal  organization.”  Id.  at  220  (emphasis  added).     A  zygote,  which  develops  into  
an  embryo,  which  develops  into  a  fetus,  then,  is  necessarily  living.  The  debate  is  not  
over   fetal   life;   rather,   it   is  over  whether   the  fetal   life  constitutes  human  life.  To  be  
more   specific,   it   is   over   whether   the   fetal   life   is   a   human   being.   To   promote  
legislative   efficiency,   the   debate   of   whether   a   fetus   is   a   human   being   should   be  
avoided  in  drafting  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statutes.    
   124.     The  model   statute  avoids  going  beyond  what   is  necessary   in  providing  a  
patient  with  enough  information  to  make  a  truly  informed  decision,  which  allows  it  
to  avoid  unnecessary  undue  burden  or  compelled  ideological  speech  issues.    When  
the   sonogram   is   displayed   and   simultaneously   described,   the   patient   has   been  
informed  to  the  extent  necessary  to  make  an  autonomous  decision;  therefore,  there  
is  no  need  to  supply  the  patient  with  a  photograph  unless  she  requests  it.  
   125.     The  Louisiana  Statute   requires   that   the  physician  “make  audible   the   fetal  
heartbeat,  if  present,  in  a  quality  consistent  with  current  medical  practice.”  2012  LA.  
ACTS   685   (S.B.   708),   supra   note   51,   at   §   40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(a);   North   Carolina   and  
Oklahoma   require   that   the   patient   either   view   the   ultrasound   or   listen   to   the  
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In   the   next   section,   I   defend   the   constitutionality   of   the  
model   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statute.      By   drafting   legislation   that  
preemptively   negates   constitutional   infirmities,   states   will   be  
able   to   pass   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes   more   efficiently.    
Speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   requirements   raise   two   key   constitutional  
issues:  First  Amendment  protection  against  compelled  speech126  
and   Fourteenth  Amendment   right   to   privacy,  which   protects   a  
woman’s  right  to  have  an  abortion  without  being  subjected  to  an  
undue   burden   prior   to   fetal   viability.127      These   two   issues   are  
addressed  in  Part  IV  and  Part  V.  
HOW  MODEL  LEGISLATIONS  PASSES  THE  UNDUE  BURDEN  
STANDARD  
MODEL  STATUTE  PASSES  THE  CASEY  UNDUE  BURDEN  TEST  
A  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  requirement  does  not  place  an  undue  
burden  on   a  patient;   thus,   a   Fourteenth  Amendment   argument  
cannot   succeed   and  will   not   provide   a   basis   for   strict   scrutiny  
analysis  of  the  speech.128    By  applying  the  standards  set  forth  in  
Casey,   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes   do   not   violate   the   undue  
burden  standard  because  they  do  not  have  the  objective  purpose  
or   effect   of   creating   a   substantial   obstacle   in   obtaining   an  
 
heartbeat  of  the  fetus.    N.C.  GEN.  STAT..§  90-­‐‑21.82(1)(e)  (2011);  See  also  OKLA..  STAT.  
ANN.  tit.  63  §  1-­‐‑738.2(B)(1)(a)(5)  (West  2004  &  Supp.  2012-­‐‑2013).    The  Texas  statute  
requires  that  the  physician  makes  the  heartbeat  audible  in  a  “quality  consistent  with  
current  medical  practice”  and  that  the  physician  explain  the  heart  auscultations  to  
the  patient.  TEX.  HEALTH  &  SAFETY  CODE  ANN.  §171.012(4)(B)  (West  2010  &  Supp.  
2012);  Were   the   State   to   require   the   physician   to   provide   ideological   information  
that  the  patient  did  not  want  to  hear,  the  statute  may  be  deemed  unconstitutional.    
See  Wooley   v.   Maynard,   430   U.S.   705,   713-­‐‑17   (1977).      Within   an   ultrasound,   the  
heartbeat  is  made  visible.    Listening  to  the  heartbeat  may  help  with  the  decision  if  
the  patient  opts  into  hearing  it,  and  it  may  also  serve  the  purpose  of  protecting  fetal  
life.     However,  requiring  a  patient  to  hear  a  heartbeat  is  more  likely  to  be  deemed  
ideological  because  the  main  purpose,  almost  axiomatically,  is  to  inform  the  patient  
that  an  abortion  will  stop  the  beating  heart  that  she  hears,  despite  the  fact  that  she  
can  see  the  heart  auscultations  in  the  sonogram.    
   126.     Wooley,  430  U.S.  at  706,  713.  
   127.     See  Planned  Parenthood  of  Se.  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U.S.  833,  834  (1992).  
   128.     See  Planned  Parenthood  Minn.,  N.D.,  S.D.  v.  Rounds,  530  F.3d  733-­‐‑38  (8th  
Cir.  2008).    
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abortion.129    A  state  regulation  is  invalid  if  it  has  “the  purpose  or  
effect   of   placing   a   substantial   obstacle   in   the   path   of   a  woman  
seeking   an   abortion   of   a   nonviable   fetus.”130      To   determine  
whether  the  purpose  of  the  statute  constitutes  a  purpose  or  effect  
of  placing  a  substantial  obstacle  in  the  path  of  a  woman  seeking  
an  abortion,  the  court  should  look  to  the  objective  purpose  of  the  
statute,  not  the  subjective  motive  of  the  legislatures  who  drafted  
the   statute,   as   the  Court   did   in  United   States   v.  O’Brien,   a   First  
Amendment  case.131  
In   O’Brien,   the   Court   upheld   a   statute   that   disallowed  
anyone   from   destroying   a   draft   card   because   the   objective  
purpose  of   the  statute  was  to  protect  government  property,  not  
to   suppress   speech,   which   the   defendant   believed   to   be   the  
subjective   intent   of   the   statute.132      Similarly,   some   politicians’  
rhetoric   may   lead   people   to   believe   the   subjective   motive   of  
speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statutes  is  to  discourage  abortions;  however,  
the   objective   intent   is   to   protect   a   state’s   interest   in   protecting  
fetal   life   and   the   mental   health   of   women   through   informed  
consent.      Like   in   O’Brien,   courts   should   look   to   the   objective  
intent  of  the  statutes,  which  do  not  have  the  purpose  or  effect  of  
creating  a  substantial  obstacle  in  the  path  of  a  woman  seeking  an  
abortion.  
 
   129.     Casey,  505  U.S.  at  877.  
   130.     Id.  
   131.     United   States   v.   O’Brien,   391   U.S.   367,   384   (1968);   In   O’Brien,   the   U.S.  
Supreme  Court  upheld   the   conviction  of  David  Paul  O’Brien   for  violating   federal  
law   when   he   and   “three   companions   burned   their   Selective   Service   registration  
certificates  on  the  steps  of  the  South  Boston  Courthouse.”  Id.  at  369;  The  federal  law  
O’Brien  violated  was  a  statute  that  disallowed  anyone  from  destroying  a  draft  card.    
Id.  at  369-­‐‑70;  O’Brien  argued  that   the  statute  was  unconstitutional  “because   it  was  
enacted   to   abridge   free   speech,   and   because   it   served   no   legitimate   legislative  
purpose.”   Id.   at   370;  The  Court  held   that   the   federal   statute  was   constitutional   as  
enacted  and  applied  because   it   is   facially  neutral   in   that   it  makes   certain   conduct  
illegal,   not   certain   speech.   Id.   at   375;   The   statute   does   not   “distinguish   between  
public  and  private  destruction,”  nor  does   it  punish   for   the   intended  expression  of  
the  destruction;  the  law  is  merely  designed  to  protect  government  property.  Id.;  The  
Court  reasoned  that  the  purpose  of  the  statute  was  not  to  suppress  symbolic  speech.    
Id.  at  376-­‐‑82;  In  so  reasoning,  the  Court  looked  to  the  objective  intent  of  the  statute  
rather  than  the  subjective  intent  proffered  by  O’Brien.  Id.;  This  case  set  a  standard  of  
statutory  interpretation  for  First  Amendment  issues  to  look  to  the  objective  intent  of  
the  statute  rather  than  the  subjective  intent.  See  generally  id.  at  367.  
   132.     Id.  at  375.    
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The   Court   in  Casey   reaffirmed  Roe’s   essential   holding   that  
“the   principle   that   the   State   has   legitimate   interests   from   the  
outset   of   the   pregnancy   in   protecting   the   health   of   the  woman  
and  the  life  of  the  fetus  that  may  become  a  child.”133    Casey  held  
that  “[t]o  protect  the  central  right  recognized  by  Roe  while  at  the  
same   time   accommodating   the   State’s   profound   interest   in  
[protecting]  potential  life  .  .  .  the  undue  burden  standard  should  
be   employed.”134      The   statutes   pass  Casey’s   undue   burden   test  
because   the  objective  purpose  of   the   statute   serves   a   legitimate  
state   interest   rather   than   the   purpose   of   placing   a   substantial  
obstacle  in  the  way  of  a  patient  seeking  an  abortion.135     The  key  
legitimate  state   interest   that  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statutes  further  
is   to  ensure   that  patients  are   fully   informed  of   their  decision   to  
have  an  abortion.    By  providing  a  patient  with  this  information,  
she  can  make  a  truly  informed  and  autonomous  decision.  
In  rejecting  Roe’s  rigid  trimester  framework,  Casey  held  that  
“[t]o   promote   the   State’s   interest   in   potential   life   throughout  
pregnancy,   the   State   may   take   measures   to   ensure   that   the  
woman’s   choice   is   informed.”136      Casey   further   states   that  
“[m]easures   designed   to   advance   this   interest   should   not   be  
invalidated  if  their  purpose  is  to  persuade  the  woman  to  choose  
childbirth  over  abortion.    These  measures  must  not  be  an  undue  
burden  on   the   right.”137     Although  politicians  may  exclaim   that  
preventing   abortions   is   the   purpose   of   the   statute,   the   law  
should  look  past  the  subjective  motive  that  politicians  champion  
and  look  to  the  objective  purpose  of  the  statute.138    The  objective  
purpose   of   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes   is   to   confirm   that   an  
abortion  is  the  autonomous  decision  of  a  patient  only  after  she  is  
fully   informed   in   an   effort   to   protect   fetal   life   and   the  mental  
 
   133.     Planned  Parenthood  of  Se.  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U.S.  833,  846  (1992)  (citing  Roe  
v.  Wade,  410  U.S.  113  (1973)).    
   134.     Id.  at  837  (internal  citations  omitted).  
   135.     Id.  at  877.    
   136.     Id.  at  837.    
   137.     Id.    
   138.     United  States  v.  O’Brien,  391  U.S.  367,  383-­‐‑84  (1968).    
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health   of   patients,   as   allowed   by   Casey,139   and   statutorily  
sufficient   if   adhering   to   the   interpretive   rule   laid   out   in  
O’Brien.140  
Furthermore,  the  statutes  pass  the  Casey  undue  burden  test  
because  the  effect  of   the  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  is  not  a  substantial  
obstacle   in   seeking   an   abortion.      To   obtain   informed   consent,  
physicians  are  required  only  to  provide  medical  information  that  
is   truthful,  non-­‐‑misleading,   and   relevant   to  a  patient’s  decision  
to  have  an  abortion.     The  effect  of  providing  a  sonogram  and  a  
description   of   it   is   to   personalize   the   information   a   patient  
receives  so  that  she  can  make  a  fully  informed  decision  based  on  
her   body,   not   the   body   of   another   depicted   in   a   pamphlet.    
Discouragement   of   an   abortion  may   be   an   effect   but   that   only  
confirms  the  necessity  of  the  informed  consent  requirement.141    If  
that   truthful,   non-­‐‑misleading   information   has   the   effect   of  
discouraging  abortion,142  the  information  was  clearly  relevant  to  
the  patient’s  decision.143  
If  a  patient  is  fully  informed  of  what  her  abortion  procedure  
entails   prior   to   an   ultrasound   and   is   intent   on   having   the  
procedure,  then  any  painful  emotional  reaction  that  is  evoked  in  
a  patient  is  not  likely  a  product  of  the  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  of  an  
ultrasound  but  is  more  likely  the  byproduct  of  the  reality  of  her  
decision.     At   least  one  opponent   to   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statutes  
assumes   that   “ultrasound   viewings   evoke   painful   emotional  
reactions,”   and   the   argument   claims   that   the   statutes   are  
 
   139.     Casey,  505  U.S.  833.  
   140.     O’Brien,  391  U.S.  at  377.    
   141.     Tex.  Med.   Providers   Performing   Abortion   Servs.   v.   Lakey,   667   F.3d   570,  
576,  579    (5th  Cir.  2012).    
   142.     In  Casey,   the  Court  stated  that  “we  permit  a  State   to   further   its   legitimate  
goal  of  protecting  the  life  of  the  unborn  by  enacting  legislation  aimed  at  ensuring  a  
decision  that  is  mature  and  informed,  even  when  in  so  doing  the  State  expresses  a  
preference  for  childbirth  over  abortion.”    Casey,  505  U.S.  at  883.    Therefore,  the  goal  
of   informed   consent   to   provide   a   patient   with   enough   information   to   make   a  
mature  and  informed  decision  is  okay,  even  if  the  state  shows  a  preference  for  life  
over  an  abortion,  which,  in  effect,  discourages  an  abortion.  
   143.   Scott  W.  Gaylord  &  Thomas  J.  Molony,  Casey  and  a  Woman’s  Right  to  Know:    
Ultrasounds,   Informed  Consent,   and   the  First  Amendment,   45  CONN.  L.  REV.   595,   601,  
603  (Dec.  2012-­‐‑2013).  
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designed   to   do   so.144      The   contention   is   well-­‐‑grounded   in   the  
language   used   in   only   one   of   the   statutes,   though,   which  
compels  a  physician  to  recite  to  a  patient  “that  her  abortion  ‘will  
terminate   the   life   of   a   whole,   separate,   unique,   living   human  
being’   with   whom   the   woman   shares   an   existing   and  
constitutionally  protected   relationship.”145     A   court   could  deem  
this   language   from   the   North   Dakota   statute   ideological;  
therefore,  drafters  should  avoid  employing  similar  language.    If  
the   description   of   the   sonogram   uses   the   non-­‐‑ideological  
language   proffered   in   Section   III(A)(v)   of   this   Article,   though,  
the  ultrasound  viewing  would  be   less   likely   to  evoke  a  painful  
emotional  response  beyond  what   is  necessary   for   the  patient   to  
fully  understand  the  ramifications  of  her  decision.  
SPEECH-­‐‑AND-­‐‑DISPLAY  STATUTES  PROVIDE  INFORMATION  THAT  IS  
MEDICALLY  NECESSARY  
The  Supreme  Court,  in  Casey,  also  held  that  “the  State  may  
enact   regulations   to   further   the   health   or   safety   of   a   woman  
seeking   an   abortion,”   but   “[u]nnecessary   health   regulations   that  
have  the  purpose  or  effect  of  presenting  a  substantial  obstacle  to  
a  woman   seeking   an   abortion   impose   an  undue  burden  on   the  
right.”146     Therefore,  a  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statute  need  not  only  
be  truthful,  non-­‐‑misleading,  relevant,  and  non-­‐‑ideological,  but  it  
must  also  be  medically  necessary.  
Although   the   Casey   Court   was   not   clear   as   to   what  
information   is   “unnecessary,”   the   Court   did   distinguish   three  
disclosures   that   certainly   were   not   unnecessary   in   that   they  
protected   the   State’s   interest   in   protecting   “potential   life:”  
“truthful,  non[-­‐‑]misleading   information  about   the  nature  of   the  
procedure,   the   attendant   health   risks   and   those   of   childbirth,  
and   the   ‘probable   gestational   age’   of   the   fetus.”147      More  
 
   144.     Susan  Frelich  Appleton,  Reproduction   and  Regret,   23  YALE   J.L.  &  FEMINISM  
255,  317  (2011).  
   145.       Id.  at  317-­‐‑18  (citing  N.D.  CENT.  CODE  §  14-­‐‑02.102  (2009)).    
   146.     Casey,  505  U.S.  at  878  (emphasis  added).  
   147.     Id.  at  882.    
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importantly,   the  Court  stated  that  utilizing  informed  consent  to  
protect   a  woman’s  mental  health  and   to  protect   fetal   life   is  not  
unconstitutional  and  is  thus  medically  necessary:  
It  cannot  be  questioned  that  psychological  well-­‐‑being  is  
a   facet   of   health.      Nor   can   it   be   doubted   that   most  
women   considering   an   abortion   would   deem   the  
impact   on   the   fetus   relevant,   if   not   dispositive,   to   the  
decision.      In   attempting   to   ensure   that   a   woman  
apprehend   the   full   consequences   of   her   decision,   the  
State   furthers   the   legitimate   purpose   of   reducing   the  
risk   that   a   woman   may   elect   an   abortion,   only   to  
discover   later,   with   devastating   psychological  
consequences,  that  her  decision  was  not  fully  informed.    
If   the   information   the   State   requires   to   be   made  
available  to  the  woman  is  truthful  and  not  misleading,  
the  requirement  may  be  permissible.148  
Although  Casey  was  exploring   the   informed  consent  of   the  
Pennsylvania  legislation,  which  required  the  disclosure  be  given  
by  way   of   a   pamphlet,   the   permitted   content   is   not   limited   in  
form.      Therefore,   so   long   as   the   information   provided   in   an  
attempt  by  the  State  to  ensure  that  the  patient  “apprehend[s]  the  
full   consequences   of   her   decision”   is   “truthful   and   not  
misleading,”  it  is  medically  relevant.149  
Pre-­‐‑abortion   ultrasounds   provide   a   patient   with  
information  that   is  medically  necessary  to  her  decision  whether  
to   have   an   abortion,   as   it   is   not   unconstitutional   to   require   a  
physician  to  inform  a  patient  seeking  an  abortion  of  the  “nature  
of   the   procedure,   the   attendant   health   risks   and   those   of  
childbirth,   and   the   ‘probable   gestational   age’   of   the   fetus,”   as  
long   as   the   information   a   physician   is   required   to   provide   is  
“truthful”   and   non[-­‐‑]misleading.”150      The   Court   in   Casey   also  
reasoned   that   the   age   of   the   fetus   was   truthful   and   non-­‐‑
misleading   information  that   the  State  could  require  a  physician  
to   provide   because   the   information   is   important   to   a   patient’s  
abortion   decision   and   may   attribute   to   her   overall   mental  
 
   148.     Id.  
   149.     Id.    
   150.     Id.      
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health.151  
MODEL  STATUTE  CONSTITUTIONALLY  BROADENS  INFORMED  
CONSENT  
Although   a   patient’s   sonogram   is   more   personalized   and  
potentially  more  graphic,   it   is  not  unconstitutional   to  provide  a  
patient  with   this   information,   as  Casey   does   not   place   a   ceiling  
on  the  content  that  can  be  provided  nor  does  it  limit  the  mode  of  
communication   that   can   be   utilized.152      The   key   difference   in  
pointing   a   patient   toward   ultrasound   information   and  
describing   a   patient’s   ultrasound   to   her   is   the   mode   of  
communication,  which  the  court  in  Lakey  deems  constitutionally  
insignificant.153      Furthermore,   there   is   not   a   constitutional  
significance   to  a  patient  as   to  how  she  receives   the   information  
because   the   information   provided   is   still   truthful   and   non-­‐‑
misleading.154      In   sum,  Casey   provides   that   information   that   is  
truthful   and   non-­‐‑misleading   can   be   required   of   physicians   to  
provide  to  patients,  not  how  it  can  be  provided,  and  the  mode  of  
communication  is  constitutionally  insignificant  to  the  patients.155  
Women’s   decision-­‐‑making   ability   and   autonomy   is   not  
compromised   by   fully   informing   them   of   what   the   procedure  
entails,   as   it   is   not   based   on   “overbroad   generalizations   about  
the   different   talents,   capacities,   or   preferences   of   males   and  
females.”156     The  purpose  of  the  statute  is  not  to  protect  women  
from  themselves  per  a  presumed  handicap,  but  rather,  it  intends  
to  provide  patients  with  the  information  a  layperson  would  not  
 
   151.     Id.  (reasoning  that  if  a  patient  is  not  fully  informed  of  the  procedure  and  its  
ramifications,  she  may  later  discover  information  that  would  have  played  a  role  in  
her   decision   as   to   whether   to   receive   the   abortion   and   that   information   may   be  
detrimental  to  her  mental  health).    
   152.     Tex.  Med.   Providers   Performing   Abortion   Servs.   v.   Lakey,   667   F.3d   570,  
578-­‐‑79  (5th  Cir.  2012).    
   153.     Id.  at  579.  
   154.     Casey,  505  U.S.  at  882,  884  (1992).  
   155.     Lakey,  667  F.3d  at  575,  579  (citing  Casey,  505  U.S.  at  882).  
   156.     Ian   Vandewalker,   Abortion   and   Informed   Consent:      How   Biased   Counseling  
Laws  Mandate  Violations  of  Medical  Ethics,  19  MICH.  J.  GENDER  &  L.  1,  10  n.  39  (2012-­‐‑
13)  (quoting  United  States  v.  Virginia,  518  U.S.  515,  533  (1996)).  
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know  of  otherwise.157  
As  the  court   in  Lakey   reasoned,  showing  and  describing  an  
ultrasound   is   the   “epitome   of   truthful,   non-­‐‑misleading  
information[;]”158  however,  the  language  used  in  the  description  
requirement   should  be  very   concise,   as  discussed   in   the  model  
statute.  
THE  MODEL  STATUTE  CONSTITUTIONALLY  COMPELS  SPEECH  
THE  MODEL  STATUTE  SHOULD  NOT  RECEIVE  STRICT  SCRUTINY  
ANALYSIS  
Speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statutes  require  the  conveyance  of  non-­‐‑
ideological,   narrowly   tailored   information   to   further   states’  
legitimate   interest   in  promoting   fetal   life  and   the  mental  health  
of   the   woman;   therefore,   model   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes  
should   not   receive   strict   scrutiny   analysis.      In   Wooley,   the  
Supreme   Court   held   that   when   the   State   compels   ideological  
speech,   it   is   only   constitutional   if   the   State’s   interest   in  
compelling   speech   is   narrowly   tailored,   compelling,   and   it  
outweighs   the   First   Amendment   protection;159   however,   the  
Court   did   not   determine   what   level   of   analysis   should   be  
applied   to   compelled   speech   that   is   non-­‐‑ideological.      The  
Supreme   Court   defined   ideological   speech   as   speech   that  
conveys  a  “point  of  view.”160  
The  court  in  Lakey  appropriately  applied  a  more  lenient  tier  
of   scrutiny   to   the   First   Amendment   review   of   the   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑
display  statute,  whereas  the  Stuart  court  inappropriately  applied  
strict  scrutiny  by  deeming  the  speech  ideological.161    Both  courts  
 
   157.     Id.  at  3,  10  n.  39  (citing  Miss.  Univ.  for  Women  v.  Hogan,  458  U.S.  718,  725  
(1982)).  
   158.     Lakey,  667  F.3d  at  578.    
   159.     The   Court   stated   that   a   state   cannot   convey   its   ideological  message   in   a  
manner   that   “outweigh[s]   an   individual’s   First   Amendment   right   to   avoid  
becoming  the  courier  for  such  message[,]"ʺ    no  matter  how  acceptable  that  message  
is  to  some  of  its  citizens.  Wooley  v.  Maynard,  430  U.S.  705,  716-­‐‑17  (1977).  
   160.     See  id.  at  720-­‐‑21.  
   161.     Stuart   v.   Huff,   834   F.   Supp.   2d   424,   429,   431   (M.D.N.C.   2011).      It   was  
uncontested  that  the  speech  the  statute  required  was  compelled;  however,  the  court  
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applied   an   analysis   akin   to   the   analysis   laid   out   in  Wooley   by  
identifying   whether   a   First   Amendment   protection   was  
triggered   and   determining   whether   the   compelling   interest   of  
the   state   outweighed   the   protection   provided   by   the   First  
Amendment.162      Both   courts   acknowledged   that   a   First  
Amendment   protection   was   triggered,   and   it   was   held   that  
speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  requirements  constitute  compelled  speech.163    
The  analysis   then  shifts   to  which   level  of  scrutiny  to  apply  and  
what   interest   the   state   has   for   infringing   upon   the   First  
Amendment   protection   that   is   provided   to   physicians  who   are  
required  to  convey  the  state’s  message.164  
The   court   in   Stuart   diverged   from   the   court   in   Lakey   by  
deeming   the   compelled   speech   ideological.165     When  compelled  
speech  is   ideological,  strict  scrutiny  applies.166     However,  as  the  
court   in  Lakey   reasoned,  showing  and  describing  a  sonogram  is  
not  ideological  speech.167     Rather,  it  is  the  epitome  of  objectivity  
because   it   is   purely   scientific.168      In   Stuart,   the   court   did   not  
provide   reasoning   for   deeming   the   speech   ideological   or  
misleading  beyond  stating  it  was  a  non-­‐‑medical  opinion.169  
Showing   and   describing   a   sonogram   is   not   providing   a  
patient  with   a   point   of   view;   rather,   it   provides   a   patient  with  
enough   information   to   ensure   that   she   can   make   an   informed  
and  mature  decision  “even  when  in  so  doing  the  State  expresses  
a   preference   for   childbirth   over   abortion.”170      This   information,  
as   determined   by  Casey,   is   medically   necessary   and   thus   non-­‐‑
ideological.      In   accordance   with   the   Casey   Court,   information  
 
based  its  reasoning  for  applying  strict  scrutiny  not  on  compelled  speech  alone,  but  
on  compelled  ideological  speech,  as  provided  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  
in  Wooley.    Id.  (citing  Wooley,  430  U.S.  at  717).    
   162.     Wooley,  430  U.S.  at  715-­‐‑16.    
   163.     Stuart,  834  F.  Supp.  2d  at  429.  
   164.     Wooley,  430  U.S.  at  716-­‐‑17.  
   165.       Stuart,  834  F.  Supp.  2d  at  429,  431-­‐‑32.  
   166.       Id.  at  429.  
   167.     Tex.  Med.  Providers  Performing  Abortion  Servs.  v.  Lakey,  667  F.3d  570,  578  
(5th  Cir.  2012).    
   168.     Lakey,  667  F.3d  at  577-­‐‑79.    
   169.     Stuart,  834  F.  Supp.  2d  at  431.  
   170.     Casey,  505  U.S.  at  883  
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regarding   fetal   life   is   a   type   of   medical   information   that   is  
relevant  to  a  patient’s  medical  decision,171  and  a  sonogram  is  the  
most   accurate   way   of   providing   a   patient   with   fetal   life  
information.  
Because   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes   that   are   drafted  
according   to   the  model   statute   suggested   in   Part  One   are   non-­‐‑
ideological,   it   follows   that   strict   scrutiny   does   not   apply   in  
determining   their   constitutionality.      Instead,   a   lesser   tier   of  
scrutiny  applies;  however,  Wooley  does  not  set  a  standard.    Casey  
does,   however,   provide   that   a   state   may   implicate   First  
Amendment   protections,   but   only   “as   part   of   the   practice   of  
medicine,   subject   to   reasonable   licensing   and   regulation  by   the  
State.”172  
A  STATE  MAY  COMPEL  PHYSICIAN’S  SPEECH  AS  A  REASONABLE  
REGULATION  OF  THE  MEDICAL  FIELD  
If  the  Casey  Standard  Alone  Were  Applied  
If   the   Casey   standard   alone   were   applied,   a   state   could  
compel  a  physician  to  convey  information  of  any  content  in  any  
manner  so  long  as  it  was  a  reasonable  regulation  of  the  medical  
field.173    As  determined  in  Casey,  states  have  a  legitimate  interest  
in   protecting   fetal   life   and   the   mental   health   of   a   patient.    
Displaying  and  describing  an  ultrasound  empowers  a  patient  to  
make  a  truly  autonomous,  informed  decision  even  if  in  doing  so  
it  discourages  an  abortion.      Furthermore,  discouragement   is   an  
effect,   not   a   cause,   and   because   the   objective,   truthful  
information  of  a  sonogram  being  displayed  and  described  has  a  
deterring   effect,   it   is   clearly   relevant   information   in   obtaining  
consent.174    In  addition,  information  that  may  protect  the  mental  
health  of  a  patient  as  well  as  the  life  of  a  fetus  is,  in  fact,  medical  
 
   171.     Id.  at  882;  See  also  Lakey,  667  F.3d  at  578.  
   172.     Casey,  505  U.S.  at  884.  
   173.     Id.  at  882.    
   174.     Tex.  Med.  Providers  Performing  Abortion  Servs.  v.  Lakey,  667  F.3d  570,  585  
(5th  Cir.  2012).    
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information.175  
The   information   a   physician   is   required   to   convey   in   a  
speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statute   is   truthful   and  non-­‐‑misleading,   as   a  
physician  is  merely  required  to  display  a  sonogram  and  describe  
it   to   a  patient.176      Like   in  Casey,   in  which   the  Court  held   that   a  
state  could  require  a  physician  to  provide  the  gestational  age  of  
a   fetus   because   it   is   important   to   a   patient’s   abortion   decision  
and  may  attribute   to  a  patient’s  mental  health,  states  should  be  
allowed   to   require  a  physician   to   take  and  display  a   sonogram  
because   it   too   contains   important   information   to   the   patient’s  
abortion   decision   and   her   mental   health,   which   are   both  
legitimate   state   interests.177      Therefore,   because   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑
display   requirements   are   truthful   and   non-­‐‑misleading,   a   state  
may  compel  physicians   to   take  a  sonogram  and  describe   it   to  a  
patient   as   a   reasonable   licensing   and   regulation   of   the  medical  
profession  so  long  as  it  also  relevant.178  
Speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes   require   physicians   to   convey  
information   that   is   relevant   to   promoting   legitimate   state  
interests  of  protecting  a  patient’s  mental  health  and  of  protecting  
fetal   life.     Speech  that  constitutes  a  reasonable  regulation  of   the  
medical  profession  by  a  state  must  be  truthful,  non-­‐‑misleading,  
and   also   relevant.179      Relevance   is   seemingly   treated   as   a  
component,  if  not  entirely,  as  requiring  a  legitimate  state  interest  
to  infringe  upon  physicians’  right  not  to  speak,180  as  relevance  is  
considered   in   each   decision   related   to   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  
requirements.      For   example,   in   Casey,   obtaining   informed  
consent  in  writing  from  the  patient  certifying  that  the  physician  
provided   her  with   information   that   did   not   pertain   to   her,   but  
rather   pertained   to   the   fetus,   was   deemed   relevant   because   it  
 
   175.     Lakey,  667  F.3d  at  576.  
   176.     TEX.   HEALTH   &   SAFETY   CODE   §   171.012(A)(4)(B)-­‐‑(C)   (West   2010   &   Supp.  
2012).  
   177.     Casey,  505  U.S.  at  882.  
   178.     Planned  Parenthood  Minn.,  N.D.,  S.D.  v.  Rounds,  530  F.3d  724,  737-­‐‑38  (8th  
Cir.  2008).  
   179.     Id.  at  738.  
   180.     Casey,  505  U.S.  at  882.  
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furthered  the  State’s  interest  in  protecting  the  life  of  the  fetus.181    
Also,   in   Rounds,   identifying   the   fetus   as   a   “human   being”  
through  statutory  definition  was  relevant   information,  as  South  
Dakota  too  had  an  interest  in  protecting  the  life  of  the  fetus.182  
While   opponents   of   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   requirements  may  
yield   the   truthfulness   of   the   anatomical   image   and   factual  
description  of  an  ultrasound,  they  are  less  likely  to  concede  that  
it   is   not   ideological   speech.      Opponents   argue   that   providing  
additional,   factually   accurate   information   will   not   make   a  
woman  more   informed   than  would   simply   supplying  her  with  
the   gestational   age   and   written   materials,   and   it   will   not  
“enhance   informed   consent   beyond  what   is   already   acceptable  
under  Casey.”183    Human  nature,  however,  renders  this  argument  
ineffective   as   an   impersonalized,   state-­‐‑sponsored   pamphlet  
depicting   another   woman’s   ultrasound   simply   cannot   provide  
the   same   personalized,   factual   information   that   a   sonogram   of  
the   actual   patient   can   provide.      A   personal   decision   requires  
personal  information.  
Therefore,   a   state  may   require   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes  
as   a   reasonable   regulation   of   the   medical   profession   because  
states   have   a   legitimate   interest   in   protecting   fetal   life   and   the  
mental   health   of   a   patient   and   displaying   and   describing   a  
sonogram  is  reasonably  related  to  that  interest.  
Closing  the  potential  gap  left  by  the  Casey  and  Wooley  standards  
Although   I   contend   that  Casey   does   address   the   issue,   for  
the   sake  of  argument,   if  Casey  does  not   fully  address   the   issue,  
speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes   may   pass   an   intermediate   level   of  
scrutiny,   which   would   safeguard   both   the   patient’s   rights   and  
the   physician’s   rights.      The   Court   in   Casey   held   that   First  
Amendment  protections   that   are   implicated  as  part  of   the   field  
of  medicine  receive  a  lesser  level  of  scrutiny  than  strict  scrutiny,  
 
   181.     Id.  at  881-­‐‑83.  
   182.     Rounds,  530  F.3d  at  744-­‐‑45.    
   183.     John  A.  Robertson,  Abortion  and  Technology:  Sonograms,  Fetal  Pain,  Viability,  
And  Early  Prenatal  Diagnosis,  14  U.  PA.  J.  CONST.  L.  327,  356  (2011).  
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requiring   only   a   legitimate   state   interest   to   infringe   upon   the  
right  of  a  physician  not  to  speak.184    In  Casey,  the  Court  conceded  
that  when   a  physician   is   required   to  provide   information   from  
the   State,   a   physician’s   First   Amendment   protections   are  
implicated,  but  only  “as  part  of  the  practice  of  medicine,  subject  
to  reasonable  licensing  and  regulation  by  the  State.”185    The  right  
of   a   physician   not   to   speak   is   thus   subject   to   the   reasonable  
licensing   and   regulation   by   a   state,186   and   a   physician   can   be  
compelled  to  inform  a  patient  of  medical  information  so  long  as  
it  is  truthful  and  non-­‐‑misleading.187  
A   careful   reading   of   the   holding   in   Casey   suggests   that   a  
rationale  basis  review  should  apply.    However,  Casey  dealt  with  
a  statute  that  provided  a  physician  performing  an  abortion  with  
discretion   regarding   the   type   of   information   to   provide   to   a  
patient   in   that   the   physician   need   only   inform   a   patient   of  
information   a   “reasonable   patient   would   consider   material   to   the  
decision  of  whether  or  not   to  undergo   the  abortion.”188     On   the  
 
   184.     Casey,  505  U.S.  at  840,  884.    
   185.     Id.  at  884.    
   186.     Id.  at  838.  
   187.       Id.  at  882.  
   188.     The  statute  required  that:    
“At   least  24  hours  prior   to   the  abortion,   the  physician  who   is   to  perform  
the  abortion  or  the  referring  physician  has  orally  informed  the  woman  of:  
(i)   The   nature   of   the   proposed   procedure   or   treatment   and   of   those  
risks   and  alternatives   to   the  procedure  or   treatment   that   a   reasonable  
patient   would   consider   material   to   the   decision   of   whether   or   not   to  
undergo  the  abortion.  
(ii)   The  probable   gestational   age   of   the  unborn   child   at   the   time   the  
abortion  is  to  be  performed.  
(iii)  The  medical  risks  associated  with  carrying  her  child  to  term.  
(2)  At  least  24  hours  prior  to  the  abortion,  the  physician  who  is  to  perform  
the  abortion  or   the  referring  physician,  or  a  qualified  physician  assistant,  
health   care   practitioner,   technician   or   social   worker   to   whom   the  
responsibility   has   been   delegated   by   either   physician,   has   informed   the  
pregnant  woman  that:  
(i)   The   department   publishes   printed   materials   which   describe   the  
unborn  child  and  list  agencies  which  offer  alternatives  to  abortion  and  
that   she   has   a   right   to   review   the  printed  materials   and   that   a   copy  
will  be  provided  to  her  free  of  charge  if  she  chooses  to  review  it.  
(ii)   Medical   assistance   benefits   may   be   available   for   prenatal   care,  
childbirth   and  neonatal   care,   and   that  more  detailed   information   on  
the  availability  of  such  assistance  is  contained  in  the  printed  materials  
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contrary,   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes,   in   essence,   obliterate  
discretion  by  compelling  specific  information  to  be  provided  in  a  
specific  manner.     Furthermore,  it  required  only  that  a  physician  
point   a   patient   to   a   description   of   a   fetal   life   rather   than   to  
provide   a   personal   account   of   the   fetal   life   within   a   patient.189    
Speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes   go   a   step   further   than   the  
Pennsylvania   statute   in   that   they   strip   the   discretion   of   what  
material  to  provide  and  the  manner  in  which  to  provide  it  away  
from   a   physician;   thus,   a   rational   basis   review   may   prove  
inadequate  to  protect  a  physician’s  First  Amendment  right  when  
he   or   she   is   no   longer   protected   by   any   level   of   discretion.    
Although   the  key  difference  seems   to  be   the  content  and  mode  
of   communication   required,   for   the   sake   of   argument,   let   us  
assume   that   the   nature   of   compelled   speech   changes   when   a  
physician  is  stripped  of  any  discretion  and  compelled  to  provide  
a  patient  with   specific   information   in   a   specific  manner,   as   the  
court  in  Stuart  seems  to  do.190  
Furthermore,   the   court   in  Stuart   points   out   this   contention  
that   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   acts   go   “well   beyond   requiring  
disclosure   of   those   items   traditionally   a   part   of   the   informed  
consent   process,  which   include,   in   this   context,   the   nature   and  
risks   of   the   procedure   and   the   gestational   age   of   the   fetus.”191    
However,  Stuart  goes  too  far  by  applying  strict  scrutiny  in  that  it  
does  not  show  deference  to  the  uniqueness  of  the  procedure  and  
the  necessity  of  a  state  to  protect  its  citizens  from  deception.    The  
Stuart  court  should  have  created  a  new  tier  of  scrutiny  because  
the  ideological  speech  necessary  to  trigger  strict  scrutiny  was  not  
present.192  
Applying   a   higher   level   of   scrutiny   than   that   provided   by  
 
published  by  the  department.  
(iii)  The  father  of  the  unborn  child  is  liable  to  assist  in  the  support  of  
her   child,   even   in   instances   where   he   has   offered   to   pay   for   the  
abortion.  In  the  case  of  rape,  this  information  may  be  omitted.”  tit.  18  
PA.  CONS.  STAT.  §  3205(a)(1)(i)  (West  2012)  (emphasis  added).  
   189.     tit.  18  PA.  CONS.  STAT.  §  3205;  See  also  Casey,  505  U.S.  at  881.  
   190.     See  generally  Stuart  v.  Huff,  834  F.  Supp.  2d  424,  428-­‐‑29  (M.D.N.C.  2011).    
   191.     Id.  at  431  (citing  generally  Acuna  v.  Turkish,  930  A.2d  416,  427–28  (2007)).    
   192.     See  generally  id.;  Wooley  v.  Maynard,  430  U.S.  705,  717  (1977).    
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Casey   would   provide   a   safeguard   against   any   unnecessary  
compelled   speech   of   a   physician,   while   allowing   a   state   to  
promote  legitimate  state  interests.    Because  Wooley  and  Casey  do  
not   state   the   level   of   scrutiny   applied   to   non-­‐‑ideological  
compelled  speech  that  is  devoid  of  any  discretion,  assuming  that  
the   lack  of  discretion  changes   the   level  of  analysis   from   that  of  
Casey,   the   level   of   scrutiny   applied   to   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  
statutes   must   either   be   developed   or   borrowed   from   another  
context.      The   commercial   content   arena   has   handled   a   parallel  
issue   regarding   the   attorney-­‐‑client   relationship,   which,   when  
coupled  with  the  Casey  medical  regulation  standard,  provides  an  
analysis  to  scrutinize  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statutes.    The  standard  
is   deferential   disclosure.      The   Court   in   Zauderer   held   that   a  
required  disclosure  does  not   implicate   an  advertiser’s   rights   so  
long  as  the  disclosure  is  reasonably  related  to  a  state’s  interest  in  
preventing  deception  of  consumers.193  
Deferential  Disclosure:  The  Proposed  Standard  of  Analysis  
Borrowing  from  Zauderer,  and  expanding  upon  Casey,  a  new  
standard  could  be  adopted  to  determine  the  constitutionality  of  
speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes:   a   standard   of   “deferential  
disclosure.”   Deferential   disclosure   is   a   standard   in   which  
compelled  speech   in   the  pre-­‐‑abortion  context   is  upheld  so   long  
as   the   compelled   speech   is   reasonably   related   to   a   state’s  
legitimate   interest   in   protecting   fetal   life   and   women’s   mental  
health   by   preventing   deception   through   providing   individuals  
with  information  that  is  so  valuable  as  to  justify  the  implication  
of   speech.194     This  would  serve  as  a   standard   for   legislatures   to  
meet  in  drafting  legislation  that  would  prevent  infringing  upon  
physician’s   rights   beyond   what   is   necessary   to   promote   state  
interests.  
 
   193.     Zauderer  v.  Office  of  Disciplinary  Counsel  of  Sup.  Ct.  of  Ohio,  471  U.S.  626,  
651  (1985).    
   194.     Deferential  disclosure  borrows  from  Casey  by  merely  requiring  a  legitimate  
state   interest   to   compel   speech   as   part   of   the   regulation   of   the   medical   field.    
Planned  Parenthood  of  Se.  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U.S.  833,  884  (1992).  
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The  aim  of  compelling  speech   in   the  commercial  context   is  
to  provide   consumers  with   information   that   is   so  valuable   that  
the   implication  of   free   speech   is   justified.195     Zauderer   regulated  
commercial  speech  by  attorneys,  who  are  professionals   just   like  
physicians.196     The  Court   in  Zauderer  upheld  a  State   law,  which  
compelled   attorneys   to   disclose   factual   and   uncontroversial  
information   regarding   their   fee   arrangements   to   protect   clients  
from   the   potential   for   deception   that   can   be   created   when  
attorneys  do  not  distinguish  between  legal  fees  and  legal  costs.197    
The   Court   noted   that   compelling   speech   in   the   commercial  
context   infringes   less   on   the   advertiser   than   prohibitions   of  
speech,   showcasing   a   preference   for   compelling   speech   over  
suppressing  speech.198  
Although   a   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statute   does   not   fit   within  
the  realm  of  commercial  speech  as  well  as  it  fits  within  the  realm  
of   a  medical   regulation,   there   is   a  parallel  with   the  aims  of   the  
protection.      In   commercial   speech,   “warning[s]   or  disclaimer[s]  
might   be   appropriately   required  .  .  .   in   order   to   dissipate   the  
possibility   of   consumer   confusion   or   deception.”199      Much   like  
compelled   commercial   speech   to   prevent   financial   harm   as   a  
result  of  any  confusion  or  deception,  displaying  and  describing  a  
sonogram  safeguards  against  any  mental  harm  to  a  patient  and  
physical  harm  to  fetal   life  as  a  result  of  misinformation,  or   lack  
thereof,  that  a  patient  may  have.200    A  layperson  may  not  be  fully  
informed   of  what   the   procedure   entails   without   the   sonogram  
and,   therefore,   may   be   subject   to   deception   by   any  
misinformation   she   may   have   received   from   non-­‐‑physicians.    
Furthermore,   even   if   the   information   a   patient   currently   has   is  
not   false  or  deceptive,   the  disclosure   requirement  may  “serve[]  
 
   195.     Zauderer,  471  U.S.  at  651.  
   196.     Id.  at  632.    
   197.     Id.  at  652-­‐‑53.    
   198.     Id.  at   651   (Noting   that   “[D]isclosure   requirements   trench   much   more  
narrowly  on  an  advertiser’s  interests  than  do  flat  prohibitions  on  speech…”).  
   199.     Id.  (quoting  In  re  R.M.J.,  455  U.S.  191,  201  (1982)).  
   200.     Much   like   a   layperson  may   not   know   the   difference   between   contingent  
fees  and  costs.    Id.  at  652.  
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some   substantial   governmental   interest   other   than   preventing  
deception.”201      Speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes   serve   a   substantial  
and   legitimate   government   interest   in   protecting   fetal   life   and  
the  mental  health  of  a  patient.  
The   speech   compelled   in   Zauderer   regarded   fee  
arrangements   to   protect   consumers   from   deception   that   could  
lead  to  loss  of  money  by  requiring  attorneys  to  provide  truthful,  
factual   information.202      The   protection  was   afforded   to   prevent  
attorneys   from   deceiving   clients   to   make   money,   even   if   the  
deception   is  unintentional.203      Similarly,   the  aim  of   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑
display   statutes   is   to   protect   fetal   life   and  mental   health   of   the  
patient   by   compelling   physicians   to   provide   truthful,   non-­‐‑
misleading  information,  which,  in  addition,  prevents  an  abortion  
provider   from   acting   out   of   self-­‐‑interest   to   promote   his   or   her  
business  by  increasing  the  number  of  abortions  provided.204  
The   parallels   between   the   aims   of   the   commercial   context  
and   the   aims   of   the   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statute   are   only  
amplified  by  its  differences.    The  compelled  speech  in  a  speech-­‐‑
and-­‐‑display  statute  provides  information  of  greater  importance,  
as   the   choice   involves   a   potential   life   and   an   irreversible  
procedure.    Although  a  consumer  who  is  deceived  out  of  money  
cannot  get  back  the  same  money  that  he  or  she   loses,  he  or  she  
can   still   earn   more   money   or   file   a   lawsuit   to   get   the   money  
back.    When  a  patient  makes  an  uninformed  decision  regarding  
an  abortion,  she  is  unable  to  reverse  that  procedure.     Thus,   it   is  
more  essential  to  prevent  deception  or  fraud  in  the  medical,  pre-­‐‑
abortion  context  than  it  is  in  the  commercial  context.  
The  balance  struck  by  deferential  disclosure  allows  the  state  
to   ensure   that   a   physician   performing   an   abortion   informs   a  
 
   201.     Id.  at  650.  
   202.     Id.  at  652.  
   203.     Id.  at  674,  679  (O’Connor,  J.,  concurring).  
   204.     Though  a  grim  outlook  on  the  abortion  business,  it  is  still  a  component  of  
business.    Business  is  designed  to  make  a  profit  or  to  at  least  break  even.    Providers  
have  self-­‐‑interest  in  conducting  an  abortion:  that  is  part  of  their  business.    To  ensure  
that  patients  seeking  an  abortion  are  protected  against  any  potential  self-­‐‑interest  of  
abortion   providers,   it   is   essential   that   a   state   protect   the   interests   of   patients   by  
compelling  providers  to  convey  a  baseline  of  information.    
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patient  to  a  level  that  promotes  the  legitimate  interests  of  a  state,  
while   providing   a   safeguard   against   a   state   from   infringing  
upon   the   rights   of   a   physician.      A   rational   basis   review   may  
allow   the   state   too   much   leeway   to   infringe   upon   the   First  
Amendment   protections   of   a   physician.      A   strict   scrutiny  
standard   may   prevent   the   state   from   promoting   its   legitimate  
interest  protecting  fetal  life  and  the  mental  health  of  the  patient.  
Applying  the  Deferential  Disclosure  Standard  
To   apply   the  deferential   disclosure   standard,   a   court  must  
1)  determine  that  the  state  has  a  legitimate  interest  in  regulating  
the   medical   field,   and   2)   that   the   compelled   disclosures   are  
reasonably   related   to   that   legitimate   interest.      In   applying   the  
deferential  disclosure  test  to  the  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statutes,  the  
disclosure   requirement   is   reasonably   related   to   the   state’s  
legitimate  interest  in  informing  a  patient  so  as  to  protect  fetal  life  
and  women’s  mental  health.  
The  state  interest  in  protecting  fetal  life  and  mental  health  is  
a   legitimate   interest.     Displaying   and  describing   a   sonogram   is  
reasonably   related   to   promoting   those   interests   because   it  
provides   truthful,   non-­‐‑misleading,   and   medically   relevant  
information   that   is   directly   related   to   the   fetal   life   and   to  
informing   the   patient   to   a   level   that  mitigates   her   exposure   to  
future  mental   health   issues   regarding   her   decision   to   have   the  
abortion.  
If  Strict  Scrutiny  Were  Applied  
Although  a  state  should  draft  a  statute  that  passes  the  Casey  
standard   and,   to   be   cautious,   the  deferential   disclosure   statute,  
as   well,   a   concisely   drafted   statute   may   be   able   to   pass   strict  
scrutiny  analysis.    The  legitimacy  of  a  state  interest  in  protecting  
fetal  life  or  protecting  the  mental  health  of  a  patient  has  not  been  
disproved   in   this   string  of   cases.      In  Lakey,   the   court   borrowed  
from  Casey   and   deemed   that   protecting   the   life   of   a   fetus   and  
protecting  the  mental  health  of  a  patient  seeking  an  abortion  are  
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legitimate   state   interests.205      In  Stuart,   these   state   interests  were  
rejected.206      However,   the   court   did   not   say   whether   the   state  
interests   of   protecting   the   mental   health   of   the   patient   or  
preventing   coercive   abortions   were   either   compelling   or  
legitimate;   rather,   the   court  merely   ruled   that,   even   if   they  were  
compelling,  the  State  interests  were  not  furthered  by  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑
display  requirements.207    The  court  in  Stuart  also  stated  only  that  
the  Court  in  Casey  did  not  deem  protecting  the  life  of  a  fetus  to  
be   a   compelling   state   interest;   however,   it   did   not   state   that   it  
was   not   a   compelling   state   interest.208      Therefore,   even   if   strict  
scrutiny  were   applied,   protecting   the   life   of   a   fetus,   protecting  
the   mental   health   of   a   patient   seeking   an   abortion,   and  
preventing   coercive   abortions   may   be   compelling   state  
interests.209  
By   correcting   the   language   used   in   the   Texas,   Oklahoma,  
North   Carolina,   and   Louisiana   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes,  
states  can  draft  legislation  that  is  narrowly  tailored,  as  well.    The  
court   in   Stuart,   applying   strict   scrutiny,   held   that   North  
Carolina’s   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   requirements  were   not   narrowly  
tailored  because  no  alternatives,  which  have  a   lesser  burden  on  
speech,   were   discounted   by   the   State.210      This   presumes   that  
there   is  a  greater  burden  on  speech  by  requiring  a  physician   to  
display   and   describe   a   sonogram   to   a   patient   than   to   simply  
require   a   physician   to   point   a   patient   toward   written  
descriptions  of  the  fetus  and  to  convey  the  gestational  age  of  the  
fetus,  as  deemed  constitutional  in  Casey.211    However,  there  is  no  
basis  for  declaring  this  burden  to  be  greater,  as  the  content  of  the  
speech   is   still   truthful,   non-­‐‑misleading,   and   relevant   toward  
furthering   the   legitimate   state   interests   of   protecting   the   fetus,  
 
   205.     Tex.  Med.  Providers  Performing  Abortion  Servs.  v.  Lakey,  667  F.3d  570,  576  
(5th  Cir.   2012)   (citing  Planned  Parenthood  of  Se.  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U.S.  833  at  882  
(1992)).  
   206.     Stuart  v.  Huff,  834  F.  Supp.  2d  424,  432  (M.D.N.C.  2011).    
   207.     Id.  (emphasis  added)  
   208.     Id.  
   209.     Id.    
   210.     Id.  
   211.     Planned  Parenthood  of  Se.  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U.S.  833,  881-­‐‑82  (1992).  
FINALCOPY.PULKRABEK.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   2/20/14    2:13  PM  
46   MARQUETTE  ELDER’S  ADVISOR   [Vol.  15  
protecting  the  mental  health  of  a  patient  seeking  an  abortion,  or  
preventing  coercive  abortions.212  
CONCLUSION  
Speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statutes,   if   drafted   to   conform   to   the  
model   statute,   should   pass   First   and   Fourteenth   Amendment  
muster  while  promoting  good  public  policy.    The  model  statute  
does  not  create  an  undue  burden  on  a  patient  because  it  does  not  
have  the  purpose  or  effect  of  placing  a  substantial  obstacle  in  the  
way   of   a   patient   seeking   an   abortion.      The  model   statute   also  
avoids   a   First   Amendment   violation   because   it   compels  
physicians   to   convey   information   that   is   non-­‐‑ideological,  
truthful,   and  medically   relevant,   an   action   that   need   only   pass  
rational  basis  review.    In  the  event  that  a  higher  level  of  scrutiny  
were   to   be   applied,   the   model   statute   should   pass   an  
intermediate   level   “deferential   disclosure”   standard,   which  
further  ensures  the  protection  of  the  First  Amendment  rights  of  
abortion  providers.      It  passes  this   intermediate   level  of  scrutiny  
because   the   disclosure   required   is   reasonably   related   to  
advancing   legitimate   state   interests   of   protecting   women’s  
health  and  fetal  life.    Lastly,  even  if  strict  scrutiny  is  erroneously  
applied  to  the  non-­‐‑ideological  model  speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  statute,  
the   statute   will   likely   pass   this   level   of   review   because   it   is  
narrowly   tailored   to  promote   state   interests   that  have  not  been  
deemed   to   be   anything   less   than   compelling.      If   legislatures  
follow   the   model   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display   statute,   they   can   pass  
legislation   that   will   protect   the   mental   health   of   patients   and  







   212.     Planned  Parenthood  Minn.,  N.D.,  S.D.  v.  Rounds,  530  F.3d  724,  737-­‐‑38  (8th  
Cir.  2008).  
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MODEL  SPEECH-­‐‑AND-­‐‑DISPLAY  STATUTE213  
Be  it  enacted  by  the  Legislature:  
  
1. No  abortion  shall  be  performed  upon  a  woman  in  this  State  
without  her  voluntary  and  informed  consent.214  
2. Except   in   the  case  of  medical  emergency  or  other  exception  
listed  herein,  consent  to  an  abortion  of  a  fetal  life  at  any  stage  
of  gestational  development  is  voluntary  and  informed  only  if  
an   ultrasound   is   performed   in   accordance   with   the  
provisions  of  this  section.215  
a. Qualifications  to  Perform  an  Ultrasound.    The  physician  who  
is   to   perform   the   abortion,   the   referring   physician,   or   a  
qualified  person  working   in   conjunction  with   either   the  
physician   who   is   to   perform   the   abortion   or   the  
physician’s   agent,   shall   perform   the   ultrasound.      For  
purposes   of   this   Section,   “qualified   person”   means   a  
person   having  documented   evidence   that   he   or   she   has  
completed   a   course   in   the   operation   of   ultrasound  
equipment   and   is   in   compliance   with   any   other  
requirements   of   law   regarding   the   operation   of  
ultrasound   equipment,216      hereinafter   referred   to   as  
“ultrasound  provider.”  
b. Requirements.      At   least   twenty-­‐‑four   hours   prior   to   the  
woman   having   any   part   of   an   abortion   performed   or  
induced,  or  at   least   two  hours  before   the  abortion   if   the  
pregnant   woman  waives   this   requirement   by   certifying  
that   she   currently   lives   100   miles   or   more   from   the  
nearest  abortion  provider  that  is  a  facility  licensed  under  
the   State   or   a   facility   that   performs   more   than   fifty  
abortions   in   any   twelve-­‐‑month   period,   and   prior   to   the  
 
   213.     Please  note  that  much  of  the  language  employed  in  this  section  is  derived  
verbatim  from  the  Louisiana,  North  Carolina,  Texas,  and  Oklahoma  statutes.    Direct  
statutory   quotations   are   not   in   quotations;   rather,   they   are   referred   to   generally.    
Also   note   that   the   model   statute   is   only   concerned   with   the   speech-­‐‑and-­‐‑display  
component   of   the   statute.      For   a   more   comprehensive   review   of   additional  
information   to   provide   pre-­‐‑abortion,   please   look   directly   to   any   one   of   the  
aforementioned  states  for  their  statutory  language.  
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administration   of   any   anesthesia   or   medication   in  
preparation   for   the   abortion   on   the   woman,217   the  
ultrasound  provider   shall   comply  with  every  one  of   the  
following  requirements:  
i. Explain  to  the  patient  that  only  an  obstetric,  
transabdominal  ultrasound  is  required;  however,  
offer  the  choice  of  having  a  transvaginal  or  other  
ultrasound  consistent  with  the  current  medical  
practice  instead.  
ii. Perform  an  obstetric,  transabdominal  ultrasound,  
unless  patient  opts  for  alternative  ultrasound,  on  the  
patient  and  simultaneously  display  the  screen  which  
depicts  the  active  ultrasound  images  so  that  the  
patient  may  view  them.    Nothing  in  this  section  shall  
be  construed  to  prevent  the  patient  from  not  viewing  
the  images  displayed  on  the  ultrasound  screen  or  to  
look  away  from  the  screen.  
iii. Provide  a  simultaneous  and  objectively  accurate  oral  
explanation  of  what  the  ultrasound  is  depicting,  in  a  
manner  understandable  to  a  layperson,  which  shall  
include  the  presence  and  location  of  the  fetal  life  
within  the  uterus  and  the  number  of  fetal  lives  
depicted,  the  dimensions  of  the  fetal  life,  and  the  
presence  of  external  members  and  internal  organs,  
cardiac  activity,  if  present  and  viewable,  and  must  
provide  the  patient  with  the  opportunity  to  ask  
questions.218  
 
   214.     N.C.  GEN.  STAT.  §  90-­‐‑21.82  (2012).  
   215.     2012  LA.  ACTS  685  (S.B.  708),  supra  note  51,  at  §  40:1299.35.2(D).    
   216.   Id.  §  40:1299.35.2(D)(1).  
   217.   Id.  §  40:1299.35.2(D)(2);  TEX.  HEALTH  &  SAFETY  CODE  ANN.  §  171.012(A)(4)  
(West  2010  &  Supp.  2012).  
   218.     2012  LA.  ACTS  685  (S.B.  708),  supra  note  51,  at  §  40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(a)-­‐‑(b).  
FINALCOPY.PULKRABEK.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   2/20/14    2:13  PM  
2013]   CLEAR  DEPICTIONS  PROMOTE  CLEAR  DECISIONS   49  
iv. Offer  to  simultaneously  make  audible  the  heart  
auscultation  for  the  patient  to  hear,  if  present,  in  a  
quality  consistent  with  current  medical  practice,  and,  
if  the  patient  opts  to  hear  the  fetal  heartbeat,  offer  to  
simultaneously  provide  an  oral  explanation  of  the  
heart  auscultation  in  a  manner  understandable  to  a  
layperson219  and  allow  the  patient  to  ask  questions.  
v. The  physician  performing  the  abortion  or  the  
ultrasound  provider  shall  refer  to  the  image  depicted  
as  a  “fetal  life.”    At  no  point  shall  the  ultrasound  
provider  or  the  abortion  provider  refer  to  the  image  
depicted  in  the  ultrasound  as  an  “unborn  child”  
alone,  but  he  or  she  may  employ  the  term  “unborn  
child”  in  immediate  conjunction  with  “fetus”  or  
“fetal  life.”  
vi. An  ultrasound  photograph  or  print  of  the  fetal  life  in  
a  sealed  envelope  clearly  marked  “ultrasound  print”  
can  be  offered,  but  is  not  required.  
c. Consent   Form.      Before   receiving   an   ultrasound   under  
Subsection  2(b)  and  before  the  abortion  is  performed  and  
before   any   sedative   or   anesthesia   is   administered,   the  
patient  completes  and  certifies  with  her  signature  a  dated  
election   form   complete   with   the   exact   time   of   signing,  
that  states  as  follows:220  
i. Ultrasound  Before  Abortion  Notice  and  Election  
Form.    The  law  of  this  State  requires  an  obstetric,  
transabdominal  ultrasound  examination  (unless  
patient  opts  for  an  alternative  ultrasound  current  
with  medical  practice)  prior  to  the  performance  of  an  
abortion.    By  signing  below,  I  certify  that  I  
understand  the  following:  
 
   219.     Id.  
   220.     TEX.   HEALTH   &   SAFETY   CODE   ANN.  §   171.012(A)(4)   (West   2010   &   Supp.  
2012);  2012  LA.  ACTS  685  (S.B.  708),  supra  note  51,  at  §  40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(d).  
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(a) I   am   required   by   law   to   have   an  
ultrasound   taken   by   an   ultrasound  
provider   and   to   have   an   oral   explanation  
simultaneously   provided   unless   I   certify  
in  writing  to  one  of  the  following:  
(i) I   am   pregnant   as   a   result   of   a  
sexual   assault,   incest,   or   other  
violation   of   the   State   Penal   Code  
that   has   been   reported   to   law  
enforcement  authorities  or  that  has  
not   been   reported   because   I  
reasonably   believe   that   doing   so  
would  put  me  in  risk  of  retaliation  
resulting   in   serious   bodily   injury  
or  death.  
(ii) I  am  a  minor  and  obtaining  an  
abortion   in   accordance   with  
judicial   bypass   procedures   under  
State  Family  Code.  
(iii) My   fetus   has   an   irreversible  
medical   condition   or   abnormality,  
as   identified  by   reliable  diagnostic  
procedures  and  documented  in  my  
medical  file.  
(b) I have the option to look at or look away 
from the ultrasound display at any time. 
(c) I   have   the   option   to   listen   to   or   tune  
out   the   oral   description   simultaneously  
provided  by  the  ultrasound  provider. 
(d) I   have   the   option   to   listen   to   the   fetal  
heartbeat   that   is   required   to   be   made  
audible   if   I   decide   to   hear   it   by   initialing  
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here:  ______ 
(e) I   am   required   by   law   to   hear   an   oral  
explanation   of   the   ultrasound   images,  
unless   I   certify   below   that   I   am  pregnant  
due   to   an   act   of   rape   or   incest   that   need  
not  be  reported. 
(f) I   have   the   option   to   ask   and   receive  
answers   to   any   questions   about   the  
images  of  the  fetal  life. 
(g) I   have   the   option   to   receive   an  
ultrasound   photographic   print   depicting  
the   fetal   life,   but   I  do  not  have   to   receive  
one  if  I  opt  out  by  initialing  here:  _______ 
(h) I   am  making   this   election   of  my   own  
free  will  and  without  coercion. 
(i) I  may  opt  out  of  having  the  abortion  at  
any  time.221 
(j) For   a   woman   who   lives   100   miles   or  
more   from   the   nearest   abortion   provider  
that   is   a   facility   licensed   under   the   State  
Code  or  a  facility  that  performs  more  than  
fifty   abortions   in   any   twelve-­‐‑month  
period,   I   waive   the   requirement   to   wait  
twenty-­‐‑four   hours   after   the   sonogram   is  
performed   before   receiving   the   abortion  
procedure.      My   place   of   residence   is  
___________________________________. 
(k) Signature   _____      Date   ____      Time  
______ 
 
   221.     N.C.  GEN  STAT.  §  90-­‐‑21.82(1)(f)  (2011).  
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d. Execution of Consent Form.  Before the abortion is performed, 
the physician who is to perform the abortion receives a 
copy of the signed, written certification required by 
Subsection 2(c); and the patient is provided the name of 
each person who provides or explains the information 
required under this subsection.  The physician must retain a 
copy or copies of the certification and the certification shall 
be placed in the medical file of the woman and shall be kept 
by the abortion provider for a period of not less than seven 
years.  If the woman is a minor, the certification shall be 
placed in the medical file of the minor and kept for at least 
seven years or for five years after the minor reaches the age 
of eighteen, whichever is greater.  The woman’s medical file 
shall be kept confidential as provided by law. 
3. Medical Emergencies.  Means the existence of any physical 
condition, not including any emotional, psychological, or 
mental condition, which a reasonably prudent physician, with 
knowledge of the case and treatment possibilities with respect 
to the medical conditions involved, would determine 
necessitates the immediate abortion of the pregnancy to avert 
the pregnant woman’s death or to avert substantial and 
irreversible impairment of a major bodily function arising from 
continued pregnancy.  Upon a determination by a physician that 
a medical emergency exists with respect to a pregnant woman, 
the provider shall certify in writing the specific medical 
conditions that constitute the emergency.  The certification 
shall be placed in the medical file of the woman and shall be 
kept by the abortion provider for a period of not less than 
seven years.  If the woman is a minor, then the certification 
shall be placed in the medical file of the minor and kept for at 
least seven years or for five years after the minor reaches the 
age of eighteen, whichever is greater.  The woman’s medical 
files shall be kept confidential as provided by law.222 
4. Professional Disciplinary Action.  The State Board of Medical 
Licensure and Supervision and the State Board of Osteopathic 
Examiners shall promulgate rules to ensure that physicians who 
 
   222.     2012  LA.  ACTS  685  (S.B.  708),  supra  note  51,  at  §  40:1299.35.2(D)(4)(b)    
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perform abortions and referring physicians or agents of either 
physician comply with all requirements of this section.223 
5. Penalties.  Any person who intentionally or knowingly fails to 
comply with any requirement of this Section shall be subject to 
penalties as provided for in the State Public Health and Safety 
Abortion provisions.224 
6. Protection of privacy in court proceedings.  In every civil or criminal 
proceeding or action brought under this Section, the court shall 
rule whether the anonymity of any woman upon whom an 
abortion has been performed or attempted shall be preserved 
from public disclosure if she does not give her consent to such 
disclosure.  The court may close any proceedings in the case 
and enter other protective orders to preserve the privacy of the 
woman upon whom the abortion has been performed or 
attempted.  This Section may not be construed to conceal the 



















   223.       OKLA.  STAT.  ANN.  tit.  63  §  1-­‐‑738.2  (West  2004  &  Supp.  2012-­‐‑2013).    
   224.     2012  LA.  ACTS  685  (S.B.  708),  supra  note  51,  at  §  40:1299.35.2(D)(5).  
   225.     S.B.  353,  2013-­‐‑14  Gen.  Assemb.,  Reg.  Sess.  (N.C.  2013).    
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